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Abstract
This thesis seeks to explain why the Department of Homeland Security had
difficulty fulfilling its roles when it was formed, specifically its role as grant administrator.
Role theory surmises that conflict arises from unclear expectations, conflicting expectations,
and too many roles. This study utilized various public testimonies, legislation, and other
government documents to examine how the missions of the twenty-two agencies that were
merged together to make up DHS changed. Even though DHS has changed continually
over the five years since its existence most employees seem to be clear on the mission of the
organization in which they work. However, there is still a considerable amount of conflict
resulting from the agencies being forced together in such a frankensteinian way.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
August 29, 2005 hurricane Katrina, a category 3 hurricane, struck the gulf coast.
The hurricane itself brought significant damage to the region, but also breached the
levees of New Orleans causing catastrophic damage the area. Many people believed that
this was the first test of the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS) that had been
created only two years previously. The Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) became a part of DHS during the largest government restructuring to take place
since President Truman. DHS took twenty-two independent government agencies with
over 180,000 employees and merged them into one cabinet level department. Merging
with DHS relegated FEMA from an independent agency to part of the much larger DHS,
but gave access to a wider range of resources (PBS, 2005). The merger also altered the
focus of FEMA from all-hazards to terrorism. According to the Government Accounting
Office (GAO), nearly three out of every four FEMA grant dollars in 2005 went to
programs solely concerned with terrorism-related disasters (GAO, 2005). Not only did
the majority of grant funding go to terrorism-related disasters, but training was also
focused on terrorism incidents. The GAO found that thirty-one of thirty-nine first
responder departments agreed that training was adequate for terrorist attacks, but not
natural disasters (PBS, 2005). The alteration of mission from an all-hazards focus to one
of terrorism led to an unclear role for FEMA and conflict.
The purpose of this study is to examine how role theory explains the conflict
within the various agencies of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and how that
conflict affected its ability to accomplish its role within the government. By ascertaining
which agencies assumed new roles after becoming a part of DHS, this study will observe
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the ways in which they were structurally incapable of reconciling these post-restructuring
new roles with their pre-restructuring duties and were thus unable to fulfill DHS’ stated
mission of providing guidance to the states on homeland security funding issues. This
study examines the missions of the twenty-two agencies that were combined to create
DHS, looking towards the various laws that created DHS and other Congressional
testimony by principal employees of DHS and others. First, this study will highlight how
DHS was created and how the current grant process operates. Then, this study will
examine the sources of conflict between DHS and the various audiences that held
expectations for DHS. Then, this study will examine role theory literature highlighting
how role theory helps to explain this conflict. Finally, this study will examine lessons
learned and how to rectify any role conflict that is present.
Methodology
Understanding the basic tenets of role theory, this study hypothesizes that as the
mission of the twenty-two agencies changed from independent government entities to
components of a larger DHS, role conflict increased and there was less satisfaction with
DHS as a whole, both from employees and the audiences (the states, Congress, other
agencies) who had high expectations for the new department. As duties were added to an
agency, prioritizing those duties added strain to the role that the agency performed before
becoming a part of the DHS and it in turn experienced role conflict. In addition, the more
that agencies were called on to coordinate with each other without a clarification of roles,
the more conflict resulted.
To understand the effect that mission change had on each agency that merged to
form DHS, this study examines all twenty-two agencies before the creation of DHS, in
2

2002 and after. This study utilized the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (PL 107-296) to
obtain the mission Congress intended each agency to have after it was incorporated into
DHS. This study examined Congressional testimony, speeches by leaders within DHS,
and legislation concerning DHS to see how the DHS leadership identified the roles of the
agencies within DHS. This study examined the Federal Capital Human survey from 2004
and 2006 and the Merit Systems Promotion Board survey from 2005 to see how the
employees of DHS felt about their performance and mission accomplishment. While
other functions transferred into DHS, as well this paper will only focus on the main
twenty-two agencies that were transferred into the new department.
The Creation of a Department
The creation of DHS was not the only option available to the President after
September 11th. It was not, in fact, the first option enacted. The first federal
organizational response was to create an Executive Order coordinator position, which
President Bush did on October 8, 2001 with Executive Order (EO) 13228. This
established an Office of Homeland Security (OHS) within the White House. Governor
Tom Ridge was appointed to head the office as the Assistant to the President for
Homeland Security. The Office of Homeland Security was tasked with “coordinating the
executive branch's efforts to detect, prepare for, prevent, protect against, respond to, and
recover from terrorist attacks within the United States” (EO No. 13228, 2001).
According to the Executive Order, the main mission of the office was to “develop and
coordinate the implementation of a comprehensive national strategy to secure the U.S.
from terrorist threats or attacks” (EO No. 13228, 2001).
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The executive order emphasized that every federal agency had a degree of
responsibility for homeland security. The advantage of having an OHS is that “the
director is positioned to rise above the particular interests of any one particular agency,
and he is located close to the president to resolve cross-agency disagreements. The OHS
also provides flexibility by relying on the broad executive power of the president” (Wise,
2002). This office was envisioned as functioning similarly to the Office of the Director
of National Intelligence, a coordinating body that would coalesce all executive branch
parties, which concern or relate to homeland security. There were a number of
disadvantages to only have an OHS primarily, no accountability to Congress. “It is
difficult to believe Congress would permit the development of a national strategy for
countering terrorism to exist for very long without establishing political accountability to
the legislative branch. Another disadvantage is that without a legislative framework
providing budgetary authority and staff, the power of the office is uncertain and subject
to the vagaries of the president or future presidents’ attention to homeland security, which
can wax and wane over the years ahead” (Wise, 2002). These disadvantages ultimately
led to the downfall of the OHS.
In 1998 Defense Secretary, William H. Cohen, chartered a bi-partisan
commission to provide a comprehensive review of national security for the emerging era.
The Hart-Rudman Commission, named for its co-chairs, issued a final report
recommending “the creation of an independent National Homeland Security Agency with
responsibility for planning, coordinating, and integrating various U.S. government
activities involved in homeland security” (U.S. Commission on National Security/21st
Century, 2001). The commission further recommended that the new agency be built
4

“upon the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), with the three
organizations currently on the front line of border security—the Coast Guard, the
Customs Service, and the Border Patrol—transferred to it. The National Homeland
Security Agency would not only protect American lives, but also assume responsibility
for overseeing the protection of the nation’s critical infrastructure including information
technology. The National Homeland Security Agency Director would have Cabinet
status and would be a statutory advisor to the National Security Council” (U.S
Commission on National Security/21st Century, 2001). The Commission also
recommended that the Department of Defense (DOD) restructure, the National Guard be
tasked with homeland security as its primary mission, and finally that Congress
restructure itself so as “to accommodate this Executive Branch realignment, and that it
also form a special select committee for homeland security to provide Congressional
support and oversight in this critical area” (U.S Commission on National Security/21st
Century, 2001). At the time, the responsibility for national security was diffused across a
number of Congressional committees. According to Perrow (2006) there were “eleven
Senate committees and fourteen House committees, as well as a large number of
subcommittees, eighty-eight in all overseeing homeland security efforts.”
Shortly after September 11th, Senator Lieberman (I-CT), then Chairman of the
Governmental Affairs Committee, called “for the establishment of a permanent,
homeland security agency with broad responsibilities to protect against threats to the
American people, including terrorist attacks” (U.S. Senate, Committee on Governmental
Affairs, Press Statement, 2001). On October 11, 2001 Senator Lieberman and Senator
Specter (R-PA) introduced S. 1534, a bill to establish the Department of Homeland
5

Security (DHS). This bill transferred FEMA, the U.S Customs Service from the
Department of Treasury, the Border Patrol from the Department of Justice (DOJ), the
U.S. Coast Guard, the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (CIAO) and the Institute
of Information Infrastructure Protection from the Department of Commerce, and the
National Infrastructure Protection Center and that National Domestic Preparedness Office
from the DOJ into the new cabinet-level agency (Act to Establish a Department of
Homeland Security, 2001). These agencies were to be organized into three directorates:
the directorate of prevention, the directorate of critical infrastructure, and the directorate
of emergency preparedness and response. Under this bill, Congress would not
restructure, committees would maintain the same oversight they had previously.
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 passed both the Senate and the House and
was signed into law on November 25, 2002. This bill created a much larger department
than that proposed by Senator Lieberman (I-CT) and Senator Specter (R-PA). The White
House proposed more agencies transferred into DHS and transferred them into four
directorates. Again Congress did not restructure, committees maintained the same
oversight as they had previously.
After the bill was signed into law, “President Bush set a four-month deadline for
DHS to open its doors to the twenty-two agencies that had to move” (Perrow, 2006).
However, this move was in name only as there was limited space in which the DHS
headquarters was set-up and the majority of agencies would not move physical locations.
The fact that no agencies moved physical locations contributed to the initial confusion
and conflict within the Department. The Department formally came into being on March
1, 2003 although a skeleton version had been in existence since January 24th (The
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American Association for the Advancement of Science, 2003). Officials stated that more
than 180,000 employees were transferred into DHS from twenty-two agencies. However,
a number of the departments, that were losing agencies, decimated those agencies slated
to transfer prior to them being subsumed into DHS. John Rollins, who became Chief of
Staff for the new DHS intelligence section, recalls absolute chaos in the early months of
the new Department. In particular within his office “there was no Under Secretary, no
Assistant Secretary and just ten aides out of the three hundred the office was supposed to
hire. Many of the new DHS offices had been picked apart by the Departments from
which they came; Rollins had moved with the FBI’s National Infrastructure Protection
Center, one of three of the center’s one-hundred and fifty staffers to make the switch”
(Glasser & Grunwald, 2005). According to reports from the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) by September 30, 2003 the DHS permanent workforce
was 109,655 employees.1 However, the Partnership for Public Service reports that DHS
had 126,276 employees in fiscal year (FY) 2004, which began October 1, 2003. Both of
these numbers indicate that DHS lost thousands of federal employees who were to have
transferred from their previous Departments.
Not only were the twenty-two agencies transferred into the new Department, there
were also several human resource systems, over nineteen accounting offices, 8,500
buildings, $44.6 billion in assets, and $36.7 billion in liabilities. Each agency transferred
brought its previous appropriations levels with it.

Congress passed a consolidated

supplemental appropriations bill in February of 2003, however DHS was not created until

1

This is only a report of permanent full-time employees and doesn’t account for contractors and part-time
employees.
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March of that year, so the supplemental only provided marginal increases in funding for a
number of programs within the new Department.
Private sector mergers and acquisitions typically take between five and seven
years to function effectively, and that sector has more advantages than the public sector
(Perrow, 2006). Public sector mergers have to deal with more stakeholders and power
centers, less management flexibility, and greater transparency than in the private sector
(Walker, 2002). The sheer magnitude of the merger was simply overwhelming for all the
involved parties. Department leaders “worked almost full time on the merger, too busy to
do much more than manage their inboxes, referee internal turf wars, and wage losing
battles with departments that commanded more clout at the White House” (Glasser &
Grunwald, 2005). Congress also required the Department to report to it regularly, within
its first year of creation, Congress called on the leaders of DHS to testify one hundred
and sixty times, about every day and a half (Perrow, 2006). All of this detracted from the
agency’s ability to fulfill its mission and to cope with the high expectations leveled upon
the new department.
Areas of Conflict
According to Steven Stehr (2005), there are two coordination problems within
homeland security. The first is that large-scale organizations often struggle to coordinate
the efforts of their sub-units. This problem is exacerbated when a number of agencies
with pre-existing missions and organizational cultures are merged, as in the case of DHS
(Stehr, 2005). The second problem occurs when multiple organizations in a given policy
area have overlapping responsibilities and must work within inter-organizational
networks to address public problems. Homeland security includes not only DHS, but
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local and state governments and public health officials. Depending on the type of
emergency, the list of relevant actors could be staggering.
A number of government agencies survey full time staff to understand how
governmental organizations are operating. The Federal Human Capital Survey (FHCS) is
a survey of full-time permanent employees that measures their perceptions of whether
and to what extent conditions characterizing successful organizations are present in their
agencies. The survey was first administered in 2002 and has continued to be reissued
every two years since. The DHS was not established until 2003, so the first measure of
the department came in 2004. In 2006 the Office of Personnel Management (OPM),
which administers the survey, sent the survey to 390,657 employees from the major
agencies on the President’s Management Council and the small/independent agencies.
The Office of Personnel management received 221,479 responses for a response rate of
57 percent across the government (OPM, Message to Federal Employees, 2006). The
DHS is a part of the President’s Management Council and had 10,367 employees respond
in 2006, which is a 56 percent response rate (OPM, FHCS, 2006). This number is similar
to the number of respondents for 2004. The OPM then weighted the responses to average
them across the responding agencies, 10,367 represents the sample of the DHS
population. All of the questions were on the standard Likert scale. Employees rated
statements on whether they strongly agreed, agreed, neither agreed nor disagreed,
disagreed, strongly disagreed, or didn’t know. Overall the DHS did not score well on the
survey. However, there were a few high points.
A number of the questions asked the employee to rate the mission, goals and
priorities of the agency; 76.4 percent of the respondents stated that they knew how their
9

work related to the agency’s goals and priorities, and 48.6 percent believed that managers
communicated the goals and priorities of the organization (OPM, FHCS, 2006). As is
evident by these responses, the majority of DHS employees indicated that they
understood the mission of the overall mission of DHS; however, they may not have
understood how their organization fits within DHS as a whole and therefore may
experience role conflict. Addressing the FHCS results before Congress, DHS Under
Secretary for Management, Paul Schneider (2007) stated, “although the general results of
the survey were disappointing we are encouraged by the fact that DHS employees have
passion for our mission. 89 percent of employees report that they believe the work they
do is important, and 80 percent like the work that they do. This is a strong foundation to
build upon for improvement.”
The U.S Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) is an independent, quasijudicial agency in the Executive branch that serves as the guardian of Federal merit
systems (MSPB, About MSPB, 2008). Since 1983, the MSPB has surveyed the Federal
workforce every two years to measure the “health” of federal merit systems principles
(Merit Principles Survey, Welcome, 2007). In 2005, the MSPB sent 74,000 employees
the survey and received 36,926 responses, a response rate of approximately 50 percent.
The MSPB only surveyed 24 agencies, one of which was the DHS. The first series of
questions asked about the understanding of the agency mission, and within the DHS, 90
percent of respondents replied that they understood their agency’s mission (MSPB, 2005
Survey, 2005). Again this indicated understanding of the overall mission of DHS and not
of the individual agencies within the organization. The only agency that did worse than
DHS on this question was the Department of Transportation (DOT), which had 89
10

percent of respondents agreeing that they understood their agency’s mission. The MSPB
reported that the lower understanding might be due to a reorganization of the agencies
that became a part of the DHS. “A recently restructured organization is still defining its
mission and communicating the nature of that mission to its employees. Even employees
who do not change jobs in such reorganization can be expected to be somewhat unsure
that their mission remains the same. A comparison of the degree to which agency
mission is understood in recently restructured organizations (92 percent) versus relatively
stable organizations (98 percent) provides some support for this assertion” (MSPB, 2005
Survey, 2005). Only 37 percent of respondents stated that their organization had
remained stable over the past two years preceding the survey (MSPB, 2005 Survey,
2005). DHS has continually changed since it was created, this may correlate with its low
numbers, however this was a snapshot in time during the early years of the department.
One byproduct of the myriad of changes that DHS has gone through is the effect
on services and products. Only 51 percent of DHS employees believe that their agency
produces high quality products and services (MSPB, 2005 Survey, 2005). DHS was the
lowest ranked agency out of 24 agencies on the MSPB survey. 43.3 percent of
employees also do not feel as if they are rewarded for providing high quality products
and services to customers (OPM, FHCS, 2006). Due to the fact that employees do not
feel rewarded for providing high quality products, this may directly relate to why only 51
percent of employees believe that the DHS produces high quality products and services.
Another area where the DHS ranked the lowest of the 24 agencies participating
was job satisfaction; only 58 percent of employees were satisfied with their job (MSPB,
2005 Survey, 2005). Similarly, only 56.6 percent of employees of DHS stated that they
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were satisfied with their job considering everything (OPM, FHCS, 2006). On the FHCS
survey 79.7 percent of respondents agreed that they liked the kind of work that they did.
Employees may like what they do, but not be satisfied with their job due to lack of clarity
of expectations for their role within the agency. 35 percent of the DHS respondents
stated that they were likely to leave their agency within the next 12 months as well
(MSPB, 2005 Survey, 2005). This could also be attributed to retirement eligibility. The
OPM anticipates as many as 60 percent of the workforce will qualify for retirement over
the next 10 years (OPM, FHCS, 2006).
The agencies that make up the DHS have gone through a myriad of rapid change
and have had to transform into a unified cabinet-level department with new roles to
accompany that change and new processes to accomplish their goals. The agencies had
to learn to work together and function as one team, when in a number of situations the
employees may have felt a bit more competition with their new colleagues. In creating a
new department, several obstacles were present including establishing a new
organizational identity without moving the agencies’ physical location or altering the
reliance of employees on the old organization for administrative support, answers to
questions, and even clarification of their role and how to balance coordination between
the two organizations.
Uncertainty and ambiguity are continually present when undertaking a restructuring
of any kind; it is even more so in a large restructuring where the employees remain in the
same location. Trying to find a headquarters for DHS has been a controversial and timeconsuming task. After five years, DHS is still spread out over 40 locations and 70
buildings throughout the Washington, DC area. Not only did the agencies that make up
12

DHS not have one location to report to, they also had to find new employees to fill a
number of positions in which the employees did not make the transition to the new
department, but chose to remain with their old department. For some agencies, this
meant that they began their work in DHS with a significant loss of institutional
knowledge and a burden to hire a number of new employees quickly. This loss of
institutional knowledge also affects organizational identity. One-way in which
organizations establish a culture is through the emphasis of ‘this is how we do things
around here.’ Without the established routine, organizations can have difficulty creating
new cultures within the DHS. However, they may also lose an efficient way of
performing their roles.
Another source of conflict in establishing an organizational culture and trying to
relieve conflict for employees was the placement of the agencies within DHS. Some
agencies were placed in directorates that did not match the goals and mission of the prerestructured mission and goals of the agency. Some agencies were separated into a
number of new agencies and placed into different directorates, however the agencies
physical location never changed. The placement of an agency in a directorate can
contribute to conflict because the expectations that the DHS has forth for a specific
directorate may not be the same as the expectations for the agencies that were placed
within it. Therefore the agency will experience role conflict because their mission does
not contribute to the overall mission of the directorate. Not only will the employees
experience conflict because of this, but also they may not then understand where their
agency fits within the DHS.
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Employees not only had to understand their role within a directorate, but also the
other agencies that were placed in that directorate with them. In a number of cases, if
two agencies work on similar areas and there is mission overlap the agencies may
experience a turf-war. The leaders of the DHS had to motivate employees to work
towards a common goal and communicate that employees are on the same team within
the department. However, due to identity and role confusion these turf-wars did not just
dissipate because the employees were told that they now composed a common team.
Employees did not just have to work with other employees with whom they may
have a conflict with, but they also had to deal with the addition of new roles, which were
different from their original mission. Employees did not just acquire new roles, but new
roles were emphasized over the old roles, one example is FEMA employees; terrorism
was emphasized over all-hazards. Employees not only needed to switch fluidly between
these new and old roles, in some cases the new roles appear to be incompatible with the
old roles.
Some offices within the DHS were new. They not only had to deal with the role
conflict and identity issues that accompany any merger, they also had to deal with being a
start-up organization. Each organization within the DHS was expected to immediately
perform exceptionally. All agencies within the DHS were given a large magnitude of
work as well. However, large bureaucracies with unclear roles often have problems
performing efficiently or quickly. The DHS also had numerous audiences and each with
different expectations for the organization.
State and local governments expected assistance for preparing for another terrorist
attack, while Congress expected grants to be allocated quickly and all roles to be fulfilled.
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Employees expected DHS to be responsive to their needs and give guidance to how they
should perform their jobs. The President and public expected DHS to fulfill all roles
assigned to it both pre-merger and post-merger. While these expectations may be
congruous, the varied expectations from different audiences contributed to role overload,
role conflict, and role ambiguity. It also led to a lack of trust; “the trust necessary to
make homeland security intergovernmental partnerships work is lacking among many
city and state officials, as well as some DHS employees due to the lack of role clarity”
(Stehr, 2005).
In Sum
DHS was created specifically to be a unifier of the agencies that monitor and
enforce laws at the border, and provide state and local municipalities a centralized
location to ask questions and apply for grants, and enhance information sharing to the
states. Mergers and acquisitions take years, the President gave DHS four months to
combine twenty-two agencies, approximately 180,000 employees, billions of dollars in
assets and liabilities, and numerous HR and accounting systems, into four functioning
directorates. Such a massive reorganization takes time even when employees change
physical locations. The employees that merged together to form the DHS not only had to
deal with remaining in the same physical location, but they also had to learn to work
together on the same team, learn new roles, and meet high expectations from a number of
audiences. DHS still does not have a central location and employees do not understand
how to balance their various roles. The frankensteinian way, i.e. a monstrous creation
that ruins its creator, that the Department was developed inhibited its ability to fulfill all
the roles of the various audiences looking to it for assistance.
15

Chapter 2 The Theory of Roles
Conflicts occur every day resulting from many causes. One cause is the lack of
understanding of a designated role within a social system. Every day people and
organizations fulfill a number of roles. To understand an organization’s role, one can
examine their mission statement. According to the Homeland Security Act of 2002,
the primary mission of the DHS is to: (A) prevent terrorist attacks within
the U.S.; (B) reduce the vulnerability of the U.S. to terrorism; (C)
minimize the damage, and assist in the recovery, from terrorist attacks that
do occur within the U.S.; (D) carry out all functions of entities transferred
to the DHS including by acting as a focal point regarding natural and
manmade crises and emergency planning; (E) ensure that the functions of
the agencies and subdivisions within the DHS that are not related directly
to securing the homeland are not diminished or neglected except by a
specific explicit Act of Congress; (F) ensure that the overall economic
security of the U.S. is not diminished by efforts, activities, and programs
aimed at securing the homeland; and (G) monitor connections between
illegal drug trafficking and terrorism, coordinate efforts to sever such
connections, and otherwise contribute to efforts to interdict illegal drug
trafficking (P.L. 107-296).
As noted in this mission the twenty-two agencies that combined to form the DHS already
had established roles within the government. No one government agency merged into the
DHS had as its primary mission to prevent terrorist attacks within the U.S. That was one
of the reasons that Congress created the DHS. However by combining these various
agencies into a new environment the role that those agencies were filling was altered, as a
result of this conflict arose within these agencies. According to Banton (1965), a “role”
can be defined as a set of norms or expectations applied to the incumbent of a particular
position. However, how roles are defined depends upon the audience defining the
expectations for a position and how much consensus there is between those defining the
role. Roles also depend upon the social system within which they are defined. Conflict
results from unclear expectations for the role, too many expectations for a role occupant,
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and contradictory expectations for a role. This chapter will provide an overview of role
theory, the basic concepts of role theory, the expectations of the DHS, and how mission
statements outline expectations of an organization.
Overview
Biddle and Thomas (1966) state that the “role analyst is concerned with
describing and understanding many of the same complex aspects of human behavior
about which dramatists, novelists, journalists, and historians write.” Role theorists have
examined individuals in various social systems to try and gain a better understanding
about why people act as they do. Role theory is not one grand theory (Biddle and
Thomas, 1966; Preiss and Ehrlich, 1966), however, it cannot be rejected outright because
the problems of role theory are inexplicably bound to the general problems of sociology
and social psychology (Preiss and Ehrlich, 1966). To truly understand role theory, one
must first dissect what a role is.
The literature does not reach a consensus as to the definition of role theory.
Holsti (1977) outlines the fact that there is no one overarching definition because
“scholars tend to define the term to suit their research needs. Since the concept of role is
used at so many different levels of analysis – from exploration of a group of children
learning to conform to the expectations of their elders, to theories of society – it is little
wonder that a universal meaning of the term has not yet been developed.” Most role
theorists believe that a role is the manifestation of a persons behavior influenced by the
expectations of others in specific contexts (Gross, Mason, & McEachern, 1966; Biddle &
Thomas, 1966; Biddle, 1986; Campbell, 1999; Floyd & Lane, 2000; Seo & Hill, 2005).
The expectations that people assume for various roles are learned through experience,
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culture, and the social systems within which people interact. Therefore, people come to
understand how to enact specific roles by observation, learning, and interaction with
others in social systems. They must learn the culture of an organization e.g. ‘this is how
we do things around here’ and the other unspoken nuances of how a given organization
operates. However, according to Nicholson (1984), role development varies according to
the constraints and opportunities of the needs and expectations of the person fulfilling
that role. Each role will be altered slightly by the person who is assuming it, and the
same roles will not be identical because each role involves a different person thus making
it unique.
The other component of this definition is the fact that these roles are fulfilled
within a social system. The type of social system is a matter of debate in and of itself and
often depends on which sub-field of role theory one consults. Over time five main
perspectives of role theory have emerged; organizational, functional, symbolic
interactionist, structural, and cognitive. One of the most prevalent and researched
perspectives is organizational. Organizational role theorists have built “a version of role
theory focused on social systems that are preplanned, task-oriented, and hierarchical”
(Biddle, 1986). “Organizational role theory proposes that individuals in organizations
occupy positions or roles which involve a set of activities, including interactions with
others, that are required or expected as part of the job” (Karakowsky and McBey, 1999).
In this area of role theory, roles are influenced by the organization, the individuals within
that organization, and informal groups that permeate the organization.
Functional role theory focuses on the characteristic behaviors of persons who
occupy social positions within a stable social system (Biddle, 1986; Campbell, 1999). In
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this sub-field roles arise from normative expectations about a function in society and
individuals are socialized into a role (Guirguis and Chewning, 2005). However, there are
a number of criticisms surrounding this concept of roles especially because not all roles
are identified with social positions. Furthermore, social systems are hardly stable, and all
roles contained therein are not necessarily associated with function (Biddle, 1986).
Symbolic interactionist role theory stresses the roles of individual actors, the
evolution of roles through social interaction, and various cognitive concepts through
which social actors understand and interpret their own conduct (Sarbin & Allen, 1954;
Zurcher, 1983; Biddle, 1986; Campbell, 1999). In this school of thought little attention is
given to the expectations that people have for the person occupying said role.
Researchers in this field focus on the individual and how the role and individual interact.
The effects that each has upon the other as well as how diverse individuals in different
roles interact with other people in their roles.
Structural role theory “represents a systems approach to a group-task situation and
proceeds from the assumption that an account of the structure of the system must precede
an effective study of its processes or dynamics” (Kabanoff, 1988). Like symbolic
interactionist, structural role theory pays little attention to expectations, here the emphasis
is on the social environment with less concerns about the individual within that
environment (Campbell, 1999). This branch of role theory utilizes mathematical symbols
to explain social structures, which are a stable organization of individuals (Guirguis and
Chewning, 2005). Structural role theory does not enjoy a large following as its
assumptions are limiting and many social scientists are not willing to accept arguments
expressed in mathematical symbols (Biddle, 1986).
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Cognitive role theory focuses on the relationships between role expectations and
behavior (Biddle, 1986). Researchers studying cognitive role theory have examined the
ways in which a person perceives the expectations of others and the effects of those
perceptions on behavior (Campbell, 1999). Empirical research in this expansive
perspective has studied role-playing, norms, anticipatory role expectations, and the
effects of role taking on behavior. Criticisms of this theory are that it tends to focus on
the individual, fails to account for the impact of environment, and tends to ignore the
evolution of roles (Guirguis and Chewning, 2005). The five branches of role theory
overlap and each has utilized some basic concepts to understand the problems associated
with role theory and the obstacles people face in the roles that they occupy.
Basic Concepts
Consensus is an important basic concept to role theory. Consensus is the degree
to which agreement of the expectations for a role exists by those defining the role.
According to Gross, et al (1958), the degree of consensus among role definers is an
important variable in how roles are filled. Just as there is never a complete absence of
consensus, there can never be a complete presence of consensus since roles are defined
by multiple groups and it is rare that multiple groups of people will agree (Preiss and
Ehrlich, 1966; Gross et al, 1958; Biddle, Rosencranz, Tomich, and Twyman, 1966).
However, consensus can be affected by a number of factors, one being the size of the
organization. The smaller the organization the more likely consensus will exist (Thomas,
1966). The number of role definers also has a bearing on consensus. The less role
definers there are the more likely there will be consensus among them regarding how a
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person should perform in a particular role. In the majority of situations, roles are defined
upon a continuum.
Role conflict occurs when people are charged with a role for which there is no
consensus. Role conflict is any situation in which the incumbent of a focal position
perceives that there are incompatible expectations (Gross et al, 1958; Sarbin and Allen,
1954; Kahn et al, 1964; Shenkar and Zeira, 1992; Floyd and Lane, 2000). Some
researchers studying role conflict have examined the various types of role conflict, and
whether the conflict exists within the role itself or rests instead in the person that is
holding two roles simultaneously. Most researchers examine role conflict and the
ramifications it has on social systems from the context of people who assume a given
role. Jackson and Schuler (1985) found role conflict to be negatively associated with six
different aspects of job satisfaction and positively associated with tension, anxiety,
propensity to leave the organization, and individual productivity. Floyd and Lane (2000)
point out that when individuals interact within well-defined roles, their interactions
become more predictable, which in turn increases ones level of trust in an organization.
Therefore, roles, which are not clear and explicit, create interactions that are less
predictable and the trust needed to facilitate exchanges within the group is more difficult
to develop. There is a debate about whether role conflict is the result of contradictory
expectations. According to Preiss and Ehrlich “contradictory expectations cannot be
fulfilled, but all of the expectations can be ignored” (1966). Gross et al (1958) had
similar findings in their research begging the question; if the occupant of the role does
not believe the expectations of said role to be incompatible, then does the conflict truly
exist?
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Of course not all situations have contradictory expectations; sometimes there is a
lack of information regarding expectations for a role. This is known as role ambiguity.
A number of factors cause role ambiguity including: organizational complexity, rapid
organizational change, and current managerial philosophies (Kahn et al, 1964). Role
ambiguity can also be seen as employees’ perceptions of uncertainty concerning various
aspects of their job (Breaugh and Colihan, 1994). Kahn et al, outlined that the ambiguity
was caused when not only expectations were unclear, but also priorities, behaviors and
performance levels as well. Role ambiguity interferes with goal accomplishment by
employees, which in turn affects mission accomplishment by the organization.
Another concept examined within role theory is that of role overload. Role
overload occurs when a person is faced with too many expectations (Biddle, 1986). Not
only too many expectations, but also too many roles. Finding a balance between roles
and the expectations of overlapping roles can be quite stressful. Being unable to perform
a role due to lack of skill or because the occupant’s personal values differ with other
expectations for a certain role may have a similar effect as role conflict, role ambiguity,
and role overload. All of these issues may occur for a role occupant, and most are seen to
have negative effects on the role occupant. However, this is not always the case.
With role overload, as one obtains more roles they also obtain more rights. While
some of these roles may cause conflict with each other, some actually complement the
existing roles that a given person holds. This is known as role accumulation. For
example, a person may join a professional organization in order to gain networking
opportunities. After being a member for a period of time they may decide that their
career would be better served if they were in a position on the board. This new role is
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acquired to further a role that the person already occupies. Sieber (1974) outlines four
positive outcomes from role accumulation, such as the aforementioned example. The
first outcome of role accumulation is role privileges. “Privileges are part and parcel of
almost every social role, if those privileges are not endorsed, then the person occupying
that role may renounce his responsibilities and even displace the person occupying that
role by force. Thus, while revolutionaries might protest the inadequacy of past rewards
for services rendered, their most stirring appeal to revolt is ordinarily couched in terms or
rights rather than in terms of rewards for past performance” (Sieber, 1974).
The second outcome of role accumulation is overall status security, which is
typically created by buffer roles. “The accumulation of buffers might be especially
critical for individuals who engage in ventures of some risk. They are also of value to
stationary individuals who fear or anticipate ego stress as a consequence of unpredictable
or uncontrollable changes in a given role relationship” (Sieber, 1974). The third outcome
of role accumulation is resources for status enhancement and role performance. Role
accumulation is a common avenue for enhancing one’s power base in society (Sieber,
1974). The fourth outcome is personality enrichment and ego gratification. “It is
possible to imagine situations in which role overload and conflict produce a good deal of
ego-gratification, namely, the sense of being appreciated or needed by diverse role
partners” (Sieber, 1974). Albeit, the accumulation of additional roles and expectations
will not always be positive, but conversely this process does not always lead to conflict
either. If a role occupant is in conflict however, there are ways to decrease or remove
said conflict.
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Resolving Role Conflict
Walker and Simon (1987) discovered four ways to resolve role conflict: merger,
altercast, interpenetration of roles, and alternation. A role occupant can choose to merge
two roles together. To altercast, a person responds to role expectations with a behavior
that reorients the target’s role expectations. To interpenetrate roles one takes the
expectations for a specific role and diffuses them throughout the other roles, which they
currently occupy. The last resolution is to alternate between the roles. All of these
solutions are prevalent in American society today where people are constantly multitasking everyday and typically trying to fulfill a number of role expectations
simultaneously.
If these solutions do not work however, there are three factors that one should
examine when attempting to discern the allocation of time and energy among roles: the
individual norm commitment, the established reward or punishment by role parties, and
the reactions of the third party or audience (Sarbin and Allen, 1954). These are not so
much ways to resolve role conflict, but ways to help the person in conflict decide which
role to activate. Some roles may need to be changed to fit the conflicting expectations.
Zurcher (1983) believes this may be appropriate “when the social systems that support
the role occupants usual roles are rendered inoperative, individuals autonomously can
find ways to make new roles. Those creations not only help the innovators maintain their
self-concepts and sense of competence, but facilitate the rebuilding of the social status
quo ante.”
Another solution to role conflict is to seek clarification from the source of the
conflict (Preiss and Ehrlich, 1966). However, this cannot be accomplished in every
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situation. When a person cannot confront their audience another solution might be to
develop scenarios for how actions within that role might be perceived by the audience for
that role. With most roles, individuals not only understand what is expected of us, but we
also internalize assumptions regarding how others conduct themselves in similar social
systems. From these assumptions it is typical to derive scenarios as to how events are
likely to develop, then conform to these expectations or exercise the flexibilities in the
role in order to best react to future conflicts.
Role scenarios are not only central to decision making, they also tend to manage
how we frame our choices. Scenarios reflect the comprehension attached to any role of
how a given system functions–its goals, procedures, cultural premises, capabilities, and
historical patterns-both in general terms and with regard to specific issues (Rosenau,
1987). However, one problem with scenarios is that they can typically only be broken
down into a few decisions, after which they become too complex to be comprehended.
Rosenau (1987) argues that role scenarios for governments are more complex than
everyday people enacting roles and help to explain why politicians are so readily the
subject of criticism. “The problems associated with elaborating role scenarios also serve
to explain why makers of foreign policy in democratic politics are so readily subject to
criticism. If they are cautious and confine their scenarios to only a few segments, they
may be charged with being unimaginative and victims of bureaucratic inertia. If they
offer clear-cut scenarios that elaborate many segments across long stretches of time, they
may be seen as ideologues with tunnel vision.”
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Expectations for DHS
The RAND Corporation (2006) conducted a nationwide survey to gather in-depth
data about the assessment of state and local response organizations’ regarding federal
preparedness programs for combating terrorism. The first survey was conducted just
prior to September 11th. They performed follow-up surveys in 2002 and 2003. RAND
discovered high expectations for DHS. The majority of organizations were expecting
funding support from DHS. “In addition, state and local organizations wanted more
information about the terrorist threat and expressed a number of views on how to improve
DHS’ Homeland Security Advisory System. State and local governments expected DHS
to improve coordination between federal, state and local levels, streamline grant
processes and requirements, consolidate training courses and equipment programs, and
finally facilitate integration of the private sector” (Davis, Mariano, Pace, Cotton, &
Steinberg, 2006). States and local governments are not just looking for money, but
assistance with coordination issues, as well as “a clearly articulated vision from the DHS
for how money should be spent” (Khademian, 2004).
“Reports by the GAO and DHS’ Office of Inspector General, as well as by the
House Homeland Security Committee, have identified the need for clear national
guidance in defining the appropriate level of preparedness and setting priorities to
achieve it. The lack of such guidance has in the past been identified as hindering state
and local efforts to prioritize their needs and plan how best to allocate their homeland
security funding” (Jenkins, 2005).

No clear definition of homeland security existed

prior to September 11th, which proved problematic with regards to funding.
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“In interviews with officials at more than a dozen federal agencies, we found that
a broadly accepted definition of homeland security did not exist. The Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) believes a single definition of homeland security can be
used to enforce budget discipline” (Yim, 2002). In July of 2002 the Executive branch
released the National Strategy for Homeland Security, in which they define homeland
security as “a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United
States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and
recover from attacks that do occur.” This definition is problematic because many of the
agencies that were merged into DHS did not have terrorism prevention as their core
mission. No one agency did, thus there was confusion about the missions of the various
agencies that were merged together to create DHS. The National Strategy for Homeland
Security is a good start, but
it is vague, lacks a clear, concise plan for implementation, fails to define
specific missions for the agencies being absorbed, and does not clarify each
agency’s relationship to DHS. For example, the DHS website contains links
to agencies being absorbed; however, some of these agencies do not have a
mission statement related to their roles in DHS, nor an acknowledgement of
their subordination to DHS. Uncertainty exists not only regarding the roles
of the individual agencies, but also that of the local and state governments.
For the department to be effective, clarification of the roles and
responsibilities within and among the different levels of government, as well
as the private sector, needs to take place (Mitchell & Pate, 2003).
As previously stated, there were many agencies involved in doling out grants to
the states for homeland security purposes. The FEMA, the Office of Domestic Programs
as part of the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) were the main players; however, they were not the only agencies to
dispense grants to states or local governments. Some grants were made directly to cities.
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When Colorado created an office of homeland security the administrator read a
newspaper story about how the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had a security
grant that went directly to water treatment facilities, which he did not know before the
article (Peckenpaugh, 2002). A major expectation for DHS was to create a “one-stop
shop” for grants, but states and Congress expected DHS to do more than fund training
exercises and equipment. They were expected to set priorities for how to spend the
money and provide guidance to municipalities regarding what should be protected. The
other issue is how these expectations were relayed to DHS. The first guidance that DHS
was given as to what was expected was through its mission.
Mission Statements
In mergers and acquisitions organizations have to create a new organizational
identity. To create a new identity, organizations must first create a new vision, highlight
common goals, and create organizational symbols (Seo and Hill, 2005). Similar to
individuals, organizations can have multiple identities and perform multiple roles. Just
like in individuals these identities and roles can have negative or positive effects, similar
to role overload. Organizations can also experience role conflict similar to individuals.
However, the response to manage this conflict is slightly different. Pratt and Foreman
(2000) examined multiple organizational identities and found four ways to resolve the
conflict among identities: compartmentalization, deletion, integration, and aggregation.
Organizations may be able to manage their multiple identities, but employees may still
identify with the original organization. In turbulent organizational environments, it is
important to ask whether employees still identify with the original organization(s), what
forms such identification assumes, and what factors drive identification (Rousseau,
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1998). In mergers and acquisitions both organizations and individuals are prone to role
conflict. One way to help alleviate role conflict is by developing a mission statement for
the new organization, and working as quickly as possible to create the new organization’s
identity.
Mission statements outline an organization’s purpose and goals. They are also
intended to motivate and therefore control the behaviors of organizational members
toward common organizational goals (Bart, Bontis, and Taggar, 2001). When creating a
mission statement an organization should seek to include its purpose, competitive
distinctiveness, product/service definition, and values (Bart and Baetz, 1998). A mission
statement allows an organization to inform the public of what to expect from it.
Throughout the 1990s companies around the world espoused the need for a mission
statement. The Government Performance and Results Act (PL 103-62) require federal
departments and agencies to write mission statements (Weiss and Piderit, 1999). Each
agency within each department has a separate mission statement that should reinforce the
overarching mission statement of the department as a whole. Despite the discussion of
the need for mission statements, little research has been done to investigate whether their
existence correlates positively to performance.
The results of a few studies to determine whether missions have a positive
correlation on organization performance are mixed, but mostly lean towards the positive
and the fact that missions matter (Bart, Bontis, and Taggar, 2001; Bart and Baetz, 1998;
Weiss and Piderit, 1999). Simply having a mission statement in and of itself will not lead
to organizational success, but it can help. Mission statements can give an employee a
sense of purpose and direction as well as define the ultimate aspiration of the
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organization. The DHS was given the mission of leading a unified national effort to
secure America through the prevention and deterrence of terrorist attacks all the while
protecting against and responding to threats and hazards to the nation. While
simultaneously ensuring safe and secure borders, welcoming lawful immigrants and
visitors, and promoting the free-flow of commerce (DHS, Strategic Plan, 2004). Given
this significant mission statement, it becomes critical to examine if all of the agencies that
were combined to create DHS help to fulfill this mission while balancing their preexisting responsibilities before being absorbed by DHS.
In Sum
When expectations are not clear for individuals they experience role conflict.
When there is a lack of information about expectations for a role the result is role
ambiguity. There is a negative correlation between role conflict, role ambiguity and job
satisfaction. There is a positive correlation between role conflict, role ambiguity and
tension, anxiety, and a lack of individual productivity. Individuals who enact welldefined roles develop more trust in an organization because their actions become more
predictable. Role ambiguity is caused by organizational complexity, rapid organizational
change, and managerial philosophies. When organizations change rapidly employees can
be faced with too many expectations. The result of this is role overload. Role overload
has both negative and positive effects on the role holder.
If an organization that has gone through a merger or acquisition has multiple
organizational identities employees may identify with the original identity and not the
new one. Mission statements are one way that new organizations create a unified
organizational identity, which outline the purpose and goal of the organization. Mission
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statements also convey to the pubic what to expect from the organization. DHS was
given a large mission to protect the U.S. from terrorist attacks, work to prevent new
attacks, all the while maintaining their previous missions, and responsibilities.
DHS had to take multiple organizational identities, numerous overlapping roles,
and a myriad of expectations from a number of audiences and merge them into a cohesive
and fully functioning organization within four months. Many of the agencies merged into
DHS had mission overlap, assumed new roles, and had their mission changed.
Examining all the mission statements of the agencies merged into DHS one will see what
new roles they were given, the expectations of the agency, and how they manage their
new organizational identity.
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Chapter 3 Mission of DHS Agencies and Directorates
The mission of DHS as outlined in the FY 2008 strategic plan is to lead the
unified national effort to secure America, to prevent and deter terrorist attacks, protect
against and respond to threats and hazards to the Nation. All the while securing our
national borders while welcoming lawful immigrants, visitors, and trade (DHS Strategic
Plan, 2008). When DHS was created the political climate was antagonistic between
Congress and the President. There was a race between the two in who could act first after
September 11th and Congress beat the President in proposing a new cabinet level
Department. The President and his staff proposed an expansive department. When
working to create DHS those who were developing the proposal looked at all agencies
(Glasser & Grunwald, 2005). However, when the President proposed the new
Department to this Cabinet, some began to lobby to ensure that they would not lose any
agencies in the merger. According to Glasser and Grunwald;
Health and Human Services Secretary Tommy G. Thompson launched a
behind-the-scenes campaign to keep a handful of offices that were
supposed to go to DHS, including the National Disaster Medical System
and the national drug stockpile. "Make sure this doesn't happen!" he
instructed Jerome M. Hauer, one of his assistant secretaries. The plan had
been put together with such speed and secrecy that after its release angry
officials had to explain to the White House how their agencies really
worked. Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham was able to beat back the
total transfer of Livermore after it became clear the Gang of Five (the
aides who proposed which agencies to make the move) had little idea what
the lab did. A similar battle unfolded over the Department of Energy's
radiological detection teams, which were supposed to be folded in with
FEMA. The White House had not realized that the teams consisted of
employees with regular jobs who mobilized only during emergencies
(2005).
Lobbyists for the industries in which some of these agencies operated were also on
Capitol Hill trying to explain why the agency that they work closely with should not be
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moved into this new department. Once it was finalized which would move and which
would not, all parties desired the agencies to move quickly and perform their new roles as
fast as possible and nearly perfect as well. It was decided that some agencies needed to
be moved to eliminate some of the mission overlap between them. This was true in
merging the many border agencies. Some agencies it appears to be random in why they
were merged, because the expectations for the agencies did not appear to be compatible
with DHS. A few agencies were created within the legislation that created the
department.
This chapter will examine the twenty-two core agencies that were combined to
create the DHS and the four directorates in which they were placed. First, this study will
discuss the four different directorates, then examining the agencies placed within each
directorate. It will examine whether the mission of the agency changed, if the agency
assumed new roles or lost roles, and if there was balance between the missions. It will
also explore if the expectations between the DHS and the agency were compatible before
the merger and if the expectations of what the agency would be doing within DHS were
clear. The last question this chapter will seek to answer is whether employees still
identify with the previous organization and why they may still have that identification.
Appendix A highlights the mission statements of each agency before it was merged into
DHS and after. To see the overall organization of the DHS shortly after it was created,
review appendix B an organizational chart.
The Border and Transportation Security Directorate
The Border and Transportation Security (BTS) directorate brought together seven
agencies from four different departments: the U.S. Customs Service from Treasury, the
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Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) from DOJ, the Federal Protective Service
from the General Services Administration (GSA), the Transportation Security
Administration from the DOT, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center from
Department of Treasury, part of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service from US
Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the Office for Domestic Preparedness from
DOJ. The mission of this directorate is preventing the entry of terrorists and instruments
of terrorism, securing the borders and all transportation systems, administering
immigration functions and policy and priorities. Two main bureaus were created from
the merger of these bureaus: the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection and the
Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement. These two bureaus absorbed the
Customs Service, the INS, and the portion of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service that was merged into DHS.
Immigration and Naturalization Services
The Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) was moved from the DOJ.
The Immigration and Naturalization Service’s mission is to administer and enforce the
immigration and naturalization laws of the U.S., including securing the nation’s borders
and apprehending illegal immigrants (Federal Service Impasses Panel, 2001). INS’
mission is twofold; prevent illegal immigrants from entering the country while updating
the status of legal non-US citizens and prevent the employment of individuals ineligible
for admission (DOJ, OIG, 2001). Thus INS’ mission is one part enforcement and one
part service. Upon its transfer into DHS, the Immigration and Naturalization Services
(INS) was abolished. The adjudication portion of INS’ mission was transferred to the
Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration while the statistical branch of the Office of Policy
34

and Programs was transferred to the Under Secretary for Management. The INS
function, which dealt with unaccompanied children, was transferred to the Director of the
Office of Refugee Resettlement of HHS (P.L 106-313, 2000). Immigration officers who
specialized in inspection, examination, adjudication, legalization, investigation, patrol,
and refugee and asylum issues were combined with the U.S. Customs Service into the
U.S Customs and Border Protection. Legacy INS employees now work in one of three
agencies: the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Service, the Bureau of Immigration
and Customs Enforcement, and the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (P.L 106313, 2000).
The mission of the INS was not changed out right, however it was altered. This
agency did not assume any new roles or lose any; however they separated the employees
who performed the two roles within this agency. The expectations for INS were clear
because they were still performing their old roles, just in different departments. The
expectations between DHS and INS were compatible. INS’ role was to prevent illegal
immigrants from entering the country and the expectation of DHS was to keep terrorists
from entering the country. There was balance between the roles because all of the roles
were separated and the agency did not assume new roles.
Due to the fact that the Immigration and Naturalization Services was dissolved
and moved, employees would have to learn to identify with their new organization that
may or may not be within DHS. Some of these employees were moved to HHS. While
employee’s jobs did not change, learning a new organizational identity could lead to role
ambiguity. Establishing an identity and establishing a new organization culture could
also lead to conflict. Organizational complexity can lead to role ambiguity and learning a
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new organizational culture and new ways to operate within the new organization would
lead to role ambiguity. Employees not only had to learn a new organizational culture, but
also to work with other agencies that they previously may have been competitive with.
U.S. Customs Service
When Customs was transferred into DHS it became one of the backbones of the
Border and Transportation Security Directorate. It was separated into two agencies; one
part combined Customs agents with Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) agents
to form the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agency, and the
other piece of the agency combined Customs agents with the Border Patrol to form the
Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP). The mission of the Customs service
did not change greatly when it was transferred; however the new bureaus missions were
slightly different and could contribute to role conflict within the Customs employees.
According, to Richard L Skinner, the Assistant IG, in testimony to Congress (2005) the
new mission and focus of CBP is to prevent terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering
the U.S. while also facilitating the flow of legitimate trade and travel (6). This keeps the
current Customs agents who are located at the border or other points of entry in similar
positions.
The focus of Immigration and Customs Enforcement is on “enforcement activities
related to criminal and administrative violations of the immigration and customs laws of
the U.S., regardless of where the violation occurs” (Skinner, 2005). Immigration and
Customs Enforcement being the investigative arm of the Border and Transportation
directorate allows employees with a specialized focus a clearer mission that could
actually alleviate role conflict. However, other issues result from splitting an
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organization in two and accordingly conflict may result from combining all these of
agencies together. Secretary Ridge highlighted this concern in a speech to INS
employees in 2003. “One of our first goals for the department this year is to integrate old
functions in a new way, to make us stronger and safer. We will take our border entities Customs, INS, Border patrol, and our Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service - and
merge them into one unified, coordinated force at the border” (Ridge, 2003). Hoping to
remove mission overlap between Customs with Immigration and Naturalization Services
and the Border Patrol, Customs was split and then absorbed by new bureaus within the
DHS in the hopes to give them greater focus.
This agency did have its mission changed for some employees. This agency
gained and lost some roles that they were previously performing. Before merging with
the DHS the expectations for Customs were compatible with the DHS and they were
clear. The DHS and Customs shared common goals for facilitating the flow of legitimate
trade and enforcing the Custom laws. Employees in this agency may still identify with
the previous agency, however because they split the employees along functional lines that
should lessen that aspect of conflict. There appears to be a balance to the new roles that
the employees who remained working on Customs issues gained.
As stated previously, the Customs agency was one of the main agencies that the
Border and Transportation Security Directorate was built around. It was separated into
two new bureaus along with the Border Patrol and Immigration and Naturalization
Services. While agencies would have worked together previously, each had their own
culture and way of operating. The merger would require them to leave that behind and
work together to develop a new organizational culture and identity. Employees would
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need to create a new organizational identity, which could contribute to role conflict. This
rapid organizational change would lead to role ambiguity. While, the clearer mission of
the new bureau may help to alleviate role conflict and may lessen role ambiguity, the
contributing factors to both of these are so strong it would take time for these effects to
take place.
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
The Animal and Plant Health Inspection Services (APHIS) Agricultural
Quarantine Inspection (AQI), was transferred into the Border and Transportation Security
directorate from the USDA. The APHIS Agricultural Quarantine Inspection has a very
specialized mission within the DHS. The AQI program examines cargo and passengers
entering into the U.S to ensure that there are no agricultural health threats contained
within. Although most Agricultural Quarantine Inspections staff were reassigned to the
DHS, the USDA retained responsibility for promulgating regulations related to the entry
of passengers and commodities into the U.S, according to Under Secretary William
Hawks (3, 2003). The USDA also retained the responsibility of collecting the user fees
associated with inspections, with the understanding that fee collection was to be
gradually handed over to the DHS. The USDA and the DHS had to create a
memorandum of agreement concerning the transfer of fees and how the two Departments
would work together to ensure that Agricultural Quarantine Inspection did not forgo new
regulations set in place by the USDA or training also conducted by the USDA. The fact
that the Agriculture Quarantine Inspection had to essentially solicit information for how
to perform its job from two departments is one cause for role conflict. Having to receive
information on job performance from the USDA instead of the DHS chain of command
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would be confusing. As a result of this, the Agricultural Quarantine Inspection
employees are unsure where to turn when faced with problems or questions the USDA or
the DHS.
The mission of this agency did not change fundamentally. They did not acquire
new roles. The expectations for this agency were compatible with the DHS as they were
expected to keep health threats from entering the U.S at the borders. The expectations
when they joined the DHS were not clear however. It was unclear who would set their
expectations: the DHS or the USDA. The majority of the Agricultural Quarantine
Inspection staff was absorbed into the DHS, however the USDA retained the information
that they needed to perform their jobs. Due to this, the AQI staff would experience role
ambiguity and possibly role conflict. The expectations of their role at the border would
come from the DHS, but expectations on how to perform their jobs would come from the
USDA. It is likely that many of these employees still identified with their previous
organization because they had to rely on the USDA for training and the regulations under
which they operated. There was balance between roles, but not a balance between
administrative roles and who was performing them the USDA or the DHS.
Another area of conflict is over the collection of fees. The USDA collects the
fees and then pays them back to the DHS. This money is utilized by the DHS for AQI
staff; however there is a conflict over the collection of the fees and transferring them to
the DHS. This adds to the stress that staff already is experiencing from becoming
employees of the DHS.
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Office of Domestic Preparedness
The DHS was created to streamline the grants process. The intent of Congress
was to distribute money faster to the states by only dealing with one Department.
However, not all programs that dealt with first responder grants were transferred into the
DHS. The main programs from the Office of Domestic Preparedness and FEMA were
transferred to the DHS. The Office of Domestic Preparedness was first given the
authority to administer grants to local responders in FY 1998. At that time only forty-one
counties and local jurisdictions received funding (DHS, Office of Grants & Training,
2008). The Office of Domestic Preparedness’ mission was “to develop and implement a
national program to enhance the capability of state and local agencies to respond to
domestic terrorism” (DOJ Inspector General, 2002). While a part of the Department of
Justice, the Office of Domestic Preparedness was broken into five functional areas. The
divisions were set-up to work with the various municipalities and assist them in
developing three-year statewide preparedness plans as well as administer equipment
grants, training grants, and a training center. Through January 15, 2002, the Office of
Domestic Preparedness awarded grants totaling about $149 million — $101.7 million to
257 grantees for equipment and $47.1 million to 29 grantees for training (DOJ, OIG,
2002).
According to a DOJ, Inspector General’s audit the Office of Domestic
Preparedness was not fulfilling its mission. “As of January 15, 2002, over $141 million
of the $243 million in funds appropriated for equipment from FY 1998 through FY 2001
had not been awarded. Furthermore, about $65 million in grant funds awarded to grantees
was unspent. Also, nearly $1 million in equipment purchased by the grantees was
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unavailable for use because grantees did not properly distribute the equipment, could not
locate it, or had been inadequately trained on how to operate it” (DOJ, OIG, 2002). In
some cases grants were disbursed as fast as seven months, in other cases it took as long as
twenty-nine months. There were a number of reasons for the delays, some on the part of
the grant recipients, but the main reason was that states did not fulfill a prerequisite set by
Congress; a completed domestic preparedness plan. Some plans were not completed
because the Office of Domestic Preparedness did not set a deadline for when the plans
should be submitted (DOJ, OIG, 2002).
After the disaster of September 11th Congress appropriated more money to assist
states in becoming more prepared. The FY 2002 State Domestic Preparedness Program
focused on responding to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). To be eligible for these
funds states must have submitted and had approved their needs assessment as well as
their domestic preparedness strategy. States could utilize these funds for equipment,
exercises, and a small amount for administrative purposes. Total funding amounted to
$315 million for the grant cycle.
In FY 2003 grants for first responders grew exponentially, so did the
responsibilities of the Office of Domestic Preparedness. The Office of Domestic
Preparedness was placed within the Directorate of Border and Transportation Security.
Its responsibilities grew from assisting states with developing and implementing their
strategic preparedness plans, administering equipment and training grants, and providing
training to: coordinating preparedness efforts at the Federal level and working with all
level of governments to on all matters pertaining to combating terrorism; coordinating
communications relating to homeland security at all levels of government; direct and
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supervise preparedness grant programs of the Federal government; providing training for
the DHS agents; serve as the lead executive branch agency for preparedness for acts of
terrorism, cooperating closely with FEMA; assist in conducting risk analysts and risk
management activities at all levels of government; and those elements of the Office of
National Preparedness (ONP) of FEMA which relate to terrorism, which shall be
consolidated within DHS in Office of Domestic Preparedness established under this
section (P.L 107-296, 2002). The Homeland Security Act of 2002 also required Office of
Domestic Preparedness to retain its functions from DOJ under the same terms,
conditions, policies, and authorities, with the required level of personnel, assets and
budget from before September 11th for FY 2003 and FY 2004 (P.L 107-269, 2002).
Kenneth Burris Jr., Region IV Director of FEMA, testified to Congress that
Office of National Preparedness’ mission is “to provide leadership in the coordination
and facilitation of all Federal efforts to assist State and local first responders (including
fire, medical and law enforcement) and emergency management organizations with
planning, training, equipment and exercises necessary to build and sustain capability to
respond to any emergency or disaster, including a terrorist incident involving a weapon of
mass destruction and other natural or manmade hazards” (2002). The Office of National
Preparedness was divided into four divisions: the administration division; the program
coordination division; the technological services division; and the assessment and
exercise division (Burris, 2002). Only the program coordination division, which is
related to terrorism, was transferred into the Office of Domestic Preparedness within
DHS. The rest of Office of National Preparedness’ responsibilities remained in FEMA.
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Congress was trying to streamline this office because there was overlap between
the Office of Domestic Preparedness and FEMA in many ways. The first overlap
between FEMA and Office of Domestic Preparedness was grant management. When
DHS was formed a new office was created to manage grants. This office was the Office
of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness (SLGCP). The SLGCP
consolidated staff from three offices; the Office of Domestic Preparedness, the Office of
National Preparedness, and FEMA’s grant management office. The three offices that
formed the Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness were
now the “federal government’s lead agency responsible for preparing the nation against
terrorism by assisting states, local and tribal jurisdictions, and regional authorities as they
prevent, deter, and respond to terrorist acts by providing an array of assistance to
America’s first responders through funding, coordinated training, exercises, equipment
acquisition, and technical assistance” (ODP Fact Sheet). This new office had to merge
these three offices in name only. All three offices remained in their previous locations,
because there was no main office location for DHS when it was created. A change of
physical location is one way to help staff create a new organizational identity. Without
helping to establish a new organizational identity employees will undergo role conflict
because they are still physically located in the other organization and still feel the
emotional ties and responsibility to fulfill the expectations that the previous organization
set, not the expectations of the new organization.
The Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness was
faced with monumental expectations. The Homeland Security Presidential Directive
(HSPD) 8 set the task of establishing a national security goal, which was the first
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expectation of the Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness.
This national security goal would enable states, local, and tribal governments to identify
needs, establish priorities in regards to homeland security, and have a reference with
which to compare their current capabilities (HSPD-8, 2003). Congress also expected the
Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness to get grants out
quickly to the states, monitor how well they were spending the grant money, and be a
resource for state and local governments by answering questions in regards to grant
funding. As stated previously, the Office of Domestic Preparedness had difficulty
performing those tasks when they were within the DOJ and they did not have to contend
with a merger. DHS received numerous complaints in regards to its handling of the grant
administration because none of the previous problems from the Office of Domestic
Preparedness were cleared up. If anything they were made worse when Congress passed
the Patriot Act of 2001, which required DHS to grant money to the states via a formula.
The USA PATRIOT ACT of 2001 states “each State shall be allocated in each
fiscal year under this section not less than 0.75 percent of the total amount appropriated
in the fiscal year for grants pursuant to this section, except that the U.S. Virgin Islands,
America Samoa, Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands each shall be allocated 0.25
percent” (P.L. 107-56). The rest of the funds were to be disbursed and allocated at the
Secretary’s discretion. Secretary Ridge decided to allocate the grants on the basis of
population. This led to smaller states receiving more funding than larger states. Funding
did not go out as quickly as Congress had hoped, and there was still confusion on what
could be funded and what the need was. Most states wanted the money to pay their first
responders salaries and other administrative costs, however the grants were not allowed
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to be utilized for that purpose and again a lot of the money was not drawn down or
utilized by the localities as intended. DHS also relied upon the DOJ Office of the
Comptroller for grant fund distribution and assistance with financial management support
(Inspector General Berman, 2005).
As laid out above, the main expectation of the Office of State and Local
Government Coordination and Preparedness was to set a national security goal that was
in sync with the expectation of managing the first responder grants efficiently. The
expectation that leads to role conflict within this agency is the expectation that the grants
would be distributed according to a formula. In Congressional testimony, Dr. Veronique
de Rugy outlines the problem to be that forty percent of the total grants are divided up
equally among all states (2005). In his haste to distribute the grants quickly Secretary
Ridge determined that the other sixty percent be distributed based upon population
because to distribute the grants on the basis of risk would require time to perform a risk
assessment of all critical infrastructure within each of the states and US territories that
were eligible for funding. The expectation to get grants out quickly and fairly to all states
regardless of where they were located led to considerable conflict within the Office of
State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness, which it is still working to
resolve.
Another obstruction in Office of Domestic Preparedness’ transformation into the
Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness was its placement
into the Border and Transportation Security directorate. Other preparedness programs
were placed within the Emergency Preparedness and Response directorate. The Inspector
General highlighted this issue in its Semiannual Report to the Congress on April 30,
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2003; “this bifurcation will create additional challenges related to inter-departmental
coordination, performance accountability, and fiscal accountability.”
The Office of Domestic Preparedness underwent a tremendous amount of changes
while DHS was establishing itself. The mission of the office did not change, however
they did acquire new roles. These roles were complementary with the roles that they
were already fulfilling though. However, there was not balance between the roles as
states wanted more assistance on the administrative tasks associated with grants and this
office was focused more on trying to get the funds out. This office also had high
expectations placed on it, when it was transferred from DOJ. These expectations were
compatible with the DHS and the relationship was clear before the merger. The
expectations to have funds quickly disbursed to the states to help them prepare for
another terrorist attack came down to how well this office was organized and set-up.
There were divergent expectations between audiences.
The states wanted money to pay their first responders and Congress wrote the
legislation as such that that was not possible. All audiences agreed that they wanted their
grants to be allocated and disbursed quickly. However, while at the DOJ the Office of
Domestic Preparedness had problems fulfilling its mandate of getting money to the states
quickly, it had an even more difficult time once it moved to DHS because of the
additional complications associated with merging with another office; the program
coordination division of FEMA. This consolidation did nothing to relieve the problems
that the original offices were experiencing. If anything it made them worse because now
the new office had to deal with both offices organizational problems and try to fulfill the
mandate from Congress to disburse funds quickly.
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This office underwent constant change since it has merged into DHS. Not only
was it combined with the program coordination division on FEMA when it was first
transferred into DHS, but it was also transferred into the Border and Transportation
directorate. The placement in this directorate separate from FEMA, which was in the
Emergency Preparedness and Response directorate is awkward and can lead to role
conflict because this office’s mission is to assist states and local governments prepare for
emergencies and their response to them not deal with the border or transportation
security. In 2005 the Office of Domestic Programs was moved again, into the
Emergency Preparedness and Response directorate, merged with a number of other
offices, renamed once again to the Office of Grants and Training and oversight was given
to FEMA. All of this change, along with the reliance on the DOJ to disburse the needed
funds in the beginning, and the high expectations would contribute to role conflict among
the employees in this office. This office has been working diligently to get information
out to the states to alleviate some of the pressure placed on it in the beginning.
Federal Protective Services
The Federal Protective Services (FPS) mission did not change fundamentally
when it was transferred from the Government Services Agency (GSA) into the Border
and Transportation Directorate, though it was expanded. Robert Peck, Commissioner of
the Federal Protective Services relayed to the Senate that “the principal mission is
building security, by which we mean protecting the affected facility, its tenants, visitors,
and their property from harm” (2000). Within DHS the Federal Protective Services still
provides security services for federally owned and leased facilities; however the
organization has seen its responsibilities sizably grow since the merger. The Federal
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Protective Services was tasked with assuming increased responsibilities alongside
Immigration and Naturalization Service agents and other custom agents.
DHS issued a fact sheet in January 2003 highlighting the reorganization of the
border security. The Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) “will bring
together the enforcement and investigative arms of the Customs Service, the investigative
and enforcement functions of Immigration and Naturalization Services and the Federal
Protective Services. The reorganization involves approximately 14,000 employees,
including 5,500 criminal investigators, 4,000 employees for immigration and deportation
services and 1,500 Federal Protective Services personnel that will focus on the mission of
enforcing the full range of immigration and customs laws within the interior of the United
States in addition to protecting specified federal buildings” (DHS, Border Reorg Fact
Sheet, 2003). However, contract guards perform most security services for federal
buildings. The Government Services Agency collects fees for providing these services to
federal buildings, manages the contracts, and provides training to those within federally
owned and leased buildings. A major complication for the changes with the Federal
Protective Services was transferring the responsibilities of contract management. The
new responsibilities of the Federal Protective Services are not laid out clearly. This may
leave staff wondering how they exactly fit into the new organization, and can contribute
to role conflict.
The mission of this agency did not change. It did however assume new roles.
The expectations of this agency with DHS were not overtly compatible before its
placement within DHS. They did share the common goal of protecting government
buildings, however the goal of enforcing immigration and custom laws do not fit with
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their previous goals. The relationship between the FPS and DHS was not clear before the
merger.
Due to the fact that the Federal Protective Services had to rely on both the
Government Services Agency and DHS to understand their expectations for their new
roles, role ambiguity would be rife within the organization. The new responsibilities
were not clear and how to balance the missions was not clear. How would people trained
to protect government buildings now enforce immigration and customs laws? Role
conflict would result from the new responsibilities that are incompatible with the
previous expectations of building protection. FPS employees would have to learn all the
customs and immigration laws while maintaining the protection of federal buildings. Part
of the law that established DHS mandated that the Government Service Agency and DHS
establish an memorandum of understanding about the transfer of contract management
responsibilities as well as training responsibilities, therefore employees of the Federal
Protective Services would also have to learn the complicated contract management tasks
and other administrative tasks. The additions of the new roles would be contributors to
role overload. These are complicated new tasks added to this organization.
Transportation Security Agency
The Transportation Security Agency (TSA) did not exist until the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act of 2001 became law shortly after September 11th. Within the
Department of Transportation, the Transportation Security Agency was responsible for
“civil aviation security, and related research and development activities; security
responsibilities over other modes of transportation that are exercised by the DOT; and
day-to-day Federal security screening operations for passenger air transportation” (P.L
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107-71, 2001). The Transportation Security Agency’s mission did not change when it
moved to DHS. It was still responsible for the “security of the nation’s transportation
systems” (TSA, 2007). When it was created, the Transportation Security Agency had the
monumental task of hiring and training thousands of screeners. Many employees who
worked as screeners prior to the creation of TSA were contract employees. The switch to
becoming a federal employee from being a contract worker could conceivably contribute
to role conflict. However, the management issues, which were present within the
Transportation Security Agency, played a larger part in the conflict when it came to
creating a unified Department.
The mission of TSA did not change when it became a part of DHS because it was
created shortly after September 11th. Employees here did not take on new roles, however
their role was altered slightly in that they became federal employees. The expectations
for TSA employees did not change when they became a part of the DHS and were clearly
laid out. The goals of TSA and the DHS were similar and the relationship between the
two is clear as well. Due to the fact that many of the employees were new employees
they most likely did not identify with DOT.
The alteration from contract employees to federal employees would contribute to
role conflict because the employees would have to adapt to the new organization and
bureaucracy that comes with being a federal employee. However, since some of the
employees were already contract employees they would be familiar with federal
bureaucracy. The employees would still have to learn their role within TSA. TSA as a
whole would have to work to establish administrative procedures because they were
brand new when they were merged into the DHS. They would have to establish these
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quickly as they needed to hire a lot of employees to fill these new positions at the airports
quickly. Having this rapid organizational change could lead to role ambiguity and having
to hire employees quickly would also lead to role conflict because so many employees
would have to be involved in hiring these employees quickly. The more people involved
in the hiring process the more likely there are incompatible expectations for those
involved.
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center
The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) was a part of the
Treasury before becoming a part of DHS. The mission of the center did not change when
it was placed in DHS. The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center “provides careerlong law enforcement training to 81 federal partner organizations and numerous state,
local, and international law enforcement agencies” (Skinner, (3) 2005). Their mission is
to train those who protect the homeland. The goal of Federal Law Enforcement Training
Center is to provide fast, flexible, and focused training to secure and protect America, as
well as develop uniform standards for training programs, facilities and instructors to
ensure high caliber training across agencies (The White House, 2008). There is very little
role conflict within the training center because its mission has remained the same, as did
its memorandum of understanding that was in place with various partner agencies to
conduct training.
The mission of this agency did not change when it was merged into the DHS. It
also did not acquire any new roles or lose any roles. The expectations for this agency
were clear and compatible with the DHS. The goals of this agency were also clear, as
they did not change. The relationship between the DHS and the agency are clear.
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Employees in this agency most likely identified with the agency itself, not the
Department from which it came, Treasury, as that does not appear to be the best fit. It
also appears that they roles that they were filling were balanced. The only question may
be why was this agency placed in this directorate, but this agency does train all Border
Patrol and Customs Agents, so that may be one reason it was placed here.
The Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate
The Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR) Directorate combined five
agencies from four departments; the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
which was previously an independent agency, the Strategic National Stockpile and the
National Disaster Medical System from HHS, the Nuclear Incident Response Team from
the Department of Energy, the Domestic Emergency Support Teams from DOJ, and the
National Domestic Preparedness Office also from DOJ specifically Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI). The agencies within this directorate oversee domestic disaster
preparedness training and coordinate government disaster response (DHS, History Fact
Sheet, 2007). This directorate is different than all the others in that it contains a stockpile
of medicine and two interagency response teams, both of which are only utilized in
specific situations. The main component of this directorate is FEMA.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency
FEMA was the backbone of the Emergency Preparedness and Response
directorate. As stated previously, it was created in a similar fashion as DHS when in
1979 President Carter took a variety of other agencies and placed them within FEMA
(FEMA, History Fact Sheet, 2007). The focus of FEMA at the time of creation was on
natural and man-made disasters. With the transfer into DHS a new focus would be
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placed upon FEMA: response, recovery, preparation for, and mitigation of terrorism. The
mission of FEMA did not change from “lead America to prepare for, prevent, respond to,
and recover from disasters” (FEMA, History Fact Sheet, 2007). However, when FEMA
was transferred into DHS the preparedness functions were separated from the response
and recovery responsibilities. There was great concern about this change. Richard
Skinner, DHS’ Inspector General noted in his testimony to Congress in January 2005,
“we do have reservations about segregating FEMA’s preparedness functions from its
response and recovery responsibilities. Disaster preparedness, response, and recovery are
intricately related, each relying on the other for success.” Again, many critics believed
that moving FEMA into DHS caused the focus on all-hazards to be lost for the focus on
terrorism. The mission may have remained the same, but the transfer into DHS created
conflict because FEMA was an independent agency.
Another problem for FEMA was the bifurcation of grants some were moved into
the Office of Domestic Preparedness, while a portion remained under FEMA’s purview.
All the grants retained within FEMA were related to preparedness, and specific disasters
and hazards. Those specific disaster and hazard grants were only available in disasters or
to mitigate certain hazards, such as flood insurance. The split between the grants keeps
expert knowledge within FEMA; however it does not fulfill the expectations for DHS to
become a one-stop shop for all grants. Interagency conflict between Office of Domestic
Preparedness and FEMA can result from keeping the old system, which has Office of
Domestic Preparedness in charge of some grants and FEMA in charge of others. In 2005
the preparedness grants were moved from FEMA into Office of Domestic Preparedness,
which was named the Office of Grants and Training.
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In 2006 Congress passed the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations
Act of 2007, which altered FEMA again. According to Matt Jadacki (2007), the Deputy
Inspector General for Disaster Assistance Oversight within DHS “these management
reforms enhanced FEMA’s mission and role as the federal government’s disaster
coordinator.” Again, the stated mission of FEMA did not change; “to reduce the loss of
life and property and protect the Nation from all hazards, including natural disasters, acts
of terrorism, and other man-made disasters, by leading and supporting the Nation in a
risk-based, comprehensive emergency management system of preparedness, protection,
response, recovery, and mitigation” (P.L. 109-295). The legislation however transferred
all preparedness functions within DHS to FEMA and helps to strengthen their standing in
the Department by not allowing the transfer of funds, assets, and personnel from FEMA.
FEMA is still recovering from the problems and conflicts that originated during the 2005
Hurricane season. While the FY 2007 appropriations legislation helps to refocus FEMA,
it also contributes to conflicts by giving FEMA more responsibility to coordinate between
agencies and the federal government’s response to disasters, natural or man-made.
This agency had its mission altered in that terrorism was added to the
preparedness, response, and recovery functions. Many people pointed out that the
addition of this new mission focus led to an imbalance of roles between a focus on
natural disasters and man-made disasters. During the two years since its placement into
DHS many believe the focus of FEMA was too focused on terrorism until the 2005
hurricane season when they turned their focus back to natural disasters. Before being
merged into DHS the expectations of FEMA and DHS were not explicitly compatible.
Upon being merged into DHS they did have clear expectations in that they were to help
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the U.S. prepare for all types of disasters. The relationship between DHS and FEMA was
clear when the mission was altered to include the terrorism focus. Due to the fact that
this agency was independent before being merged into DHS, that identity would be
stronger for employees in this organization, which was altered only slightly when merged
into DHS.
The biggest source of conflict within FEMA is the fact that it was separated into
two areas: preparedness and response and recovery. This bifurcation was done to help
FEMA focus, however it could lead to role ambiguity. In 2006, Congress changed
FEMA again back to the way it was by remerging the preparedness functions back into
FEMA. However, it was not only the preparedness functions that they previously had,
but all preparedness functions within DHS. All of this change can lead to role ambiguity.
Role ambiguity could also occur because there was no main DHS office, so the two
agencies remained in the same location, but employees had to rely on two agencies for
role clarity and expectations.
National Domestic Preparedness Office
The National Domestic Preparedness Office (NDPO) was previously part of the
FBI. According to Barbara Y. Martinez, Deputy Director of the National Domestic
Preparedness Office in 1999, the office “provides a forum for the coordination of all
federal programs that offer WMD terrorism preparedness assistance for state and local
officials. It is intended that the NDPO will serve as a much needed clearinghouse to
provide information to local and state officials who must determine the preparedness
strategy for their community.” This office included members from FEMA, the DOD, the
National Guard Bureau, the DOE, the HHS, the EPA, the Office of Justice Programs, the
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FBI, the Coast Guard, the VA, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The National
Domestic Preparedness Office coordinates six areas: training, exercise, equipment
research and development, information sharing, and public health and medical services
(Martinez, 1999).
Prior to becoming a part of DHS the National Domestic Preparedness Office was
transferred to FEMA by President Bush. In 2002 it was reported “the office has been
defunct since last year and has no employees, but it never has been officially closed”
(Peckenpaugh, 2002). When the National Domestic Preparedness Office was moved into
DHS it became a part of Office of Domestic Preparedness, which was split into two. The
part that was responsible for emergency response was under the Emergency Preparedness
and Response Directorate. In 2005, the National Domestic Preparedness Office was
again transferred into the Office of Grants and Training (G&T), which combined the
Office of Domestic Preparedness, the National Domestic Preparedness Office, and other
grants into this office. The Post-Katrina Emergency Reform Act of 2006 changed the
National Domestic Preparedness Office once again when the Office of Grants and
Training was integrated into FEMA. With all of these changes taking place in this office
there were no major changes to its role and mission, however developing an
organizational identity would be difficult with all of the changes, and this could
contribute to conflict for employees.
This office’s mission did not change when it was merged into DHS. The office
did not acquire or lose any roles. The expectations were compatible with DHS, but they
were not clear because the office was reportedly defunct in 2001. This office and DHS
did share common goals. However, due to the fact that there was no dedicated staff in
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this office, it was dependent on a variety of Departments across the government. It is not
clear what the relationship between this office and DHS would be. Due to the fact that
there was no dedicated staff they would all identify with their departments because they
did not merge with DHS. When integrated into DHS the National Domestic
Preparedness Office was incorporated into the Office of Domestic Preparedness and then
changed a number of times along with that office, if there were any employees in this
office then they would have experienced role conflict and ambiguity as a part of the
National Domestic Preparedness Office.
Strategic National Stockpile and the National Disaster Medical System
The Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) and the National Disaster Medical System
(NDMS) were both transferred from the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS). The Strategic National Stockpile is a large quantity of medicine and medical
supplies that are utilized in an emergency if local supplies are depleted (CDC, Strategic
National Stockpile, 2008). The mission of the Strategic National Stockpile did not
change and nor did the operation of the program. According to Eric Tolbert, the Director
of the Response Division of the Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate
(2003), the only change within the Strategic National Stockpile is that the DHS is
responsible for determining when and where the stockpile should be deployed. The OIG
highlighted that the biggest challenge for the Strategic National Stockpile, is that
“responsibility for the stockpile is bifurcated and unclear” (Inspector General Ervin,
2004). HHS through the Center of Disease Control (CDC) maintained the management
of the content of the stockpile. In 2004, DHS recommended returning responsibility for
the stockpile entirely to HHS (Inspector General Ervin, 2004).
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The National Disaster Medical System is a system that provides support to local
and state health agencies during natural disasters, evacuates patients throughout the US
when the causalities cannot be managed locally, and supports the DOD and the Veterans
Affairs (VA) medical systems during times of overseas conflict (Tolbert, 2003). The
purpose of the system did not change when it was transferred to DHS. The employees of
FEMA make up the National Disaster Medical System in an emergency. HHS is still the
lead agency when the National Disaster Medical System is needed, DHS is the
coordinating agency, and DOD and the Veterans Affairs are in charge of transportation
and logistics. Hurricane Katrina demonstrated how the system could easily get
overloaded. The amount of patients moved by state, local, and private hospitals was
enormous which resulted in some patients not being logged into the National Disaster
Medical System and therefore were not accounted for by the Federal government
(Franco, C., Toner, E., Waldhorn, R., Inglesby, T.V., & O’Toole, T., 2007). During
Hurricane Katrina the need was spread across three states and the system could not
deploy Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMAT’s) fast enough to handle the medical
needs of the states affected by the Hurricane.
The Disaster Medical Assistance Teams are self-contained emergency teams
comprised of thirty-five individuals who are deployed in emergency situations to stay on
top of health care needs (S. Rep. 109-322, 2006). These teams are organized by and
under the authority of FEMA. During the crisis of Hurricane Katrina the need was
massive and spread out there was confusion about the role of FEMA. Coordination
broke down among the various agencies that were supposed to help the affected states.
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The mission of the stockpile and the medical system did not change. They did not
assume new roles or lose any roles. The expectations of stockpile were clear and they
were compatible with DHS before being merged within it. However, the expectations of
the medical system were not clear, but they appear to be compatible with DHS before the
merger. The relationship between both organizations and DHS were not clear before the
merger because responsibility for the contents of the stockpile still lay with HHS and
HHS was still the lead department when the medical system needed to be activated.
DHS and HHS were not the only Departments involved in both the system and the
stockpile, DOD and the VA played a role in the operation of the medical system and the
CDC managed the stockpile. Having to respond to this many federal departments during
a disaster could contribute to the role conflict experienced by employees because each
department could have a different expectation of how these two systems should operate.
It is likely that employees who worked on the stockpile would still have identified with
HHS. The employees who administered the medical system were FEMA employees and
as stated previously they most likely still identified with their previous organization.
Interagency Teams
The Nuclear Incident Response Team (NIRT) and the Domestic Emergency
support Teams (DEST) are interagency teams that are utilized in specific incidents. The
Nuclear Incident Response Team is similar to the Disaster Medical Assistance Teams,
except the Nuclear Incident Response Team responds to nuclear incidents. The Nuclear
Incident Response Team is comprised of “those entities of the Department of Energy
(DOE) that perform nuclear or radiological emergency support functions, radiation
exposure functions at the medical assistance facility known as the Radiation Emergency
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Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS), radiological assistance functions, and
related functions, and those entities of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) that
perform such support functions and related functions” (P.L. 107-296, 2002). The
Homeland Security Act of 2002 highlights the fact that the Secretary of Energy and the
Administrator of the EPA still have the responsibility for organizing, training, equipping,
and utilizing their respective entities within the Nuclear Incident Response Team. The
DOE and EPA can also utilize the Nuclear Incident Response Team when they are not
operating as part of DHS (P.L 107-269, 2002). The Nuclear Incident Response Team
may also be called to assist at other special security events. Each event is assessed on a
case-by-case basis and because the team is so specialized it would only be utilized when
there is a great fear of a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) attack.
The other interagency team is the Domestic Emergency Support Team, which was
previously a part of the DOJ run by the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI). It is an
interagency team of experts that provide advice, guidance, and support in situations
involving WMD or other significant domestic threats (Bea, K., Krouse, W., Morgan, D.,
Morrissey, W., & Redhead, C.S., 2003). Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD-39),
created the Domestic Emergency Support Team in 1995, which stressed that “the
Domestic Emergency Support Team shall consist only of those agencies needed to
respond to the specific requirements of the incident.” By the very nature of the Domestic
Emergency Support Team there is no permanent staff at any federal agency. However,
when they are needed, the Secretary of DHS can call these teams together to provide
needed guidance and support. They have been used to respond to natural disasters in the
past, as well as the terrorist attacks of September 11th. By the very nature of both these
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teams, interagency coordination is important to their function and use. Although
responsibility for these interagency teams has changed, they have been in operation for a
number of years, so that should not affect their operation.
The mission of these two teams did not change. They did not assume new roles
or lose any roles. Their expectations were compatible with DHS before the merger to
respond to any nuclear incidents within the U.S. especially WMD attacks and the
emergency support teams incorporate those needed for specific incidents. The
expectations for what DHS would be doing with the teams were not clear, as the DOE
and EPA were still responsible for the training, organizing, and equipping the DEST.
Also, when these teams are not being utilized they are not a part of DHS. The only time
that DHS would have them within their purview was when there was a nuclear disaster or
a disaster where there is a fear that WMD are involved. This can lead to role conflict
between the employees of these teams when there is a disaster and they have to respond
to DHS due to the fact that expectations for these employees is coming from two separate
agencies.
For the Domestic Emergency Support Teams, however it is slightly different in
that there is no permanent staff at any federal agency for these teams. This team by
nature is made up of individuals from a number of agencies needed in specific situations.
The only cause of role conflict for employees of DHS would be understanding how to
manage these teams and taking on the new role of overseeing these teams and ensuring
that the right people are called up for the right situations. Concerning both of these teams
they would have common goals with DHS before the merger, but their relationship is not
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overtly clear. Due to the fact that these are interagency teams creating an organizational
identity is not needed in that they will only be called up in specific situations.
The Science and Technology Directorate
The Science and Technology (S&T) directorate combined a number of
laboratories and programs from the DOE, Department of Defense (DOD), and USDA.
This directorate is the primary research and development arm of DHS (DHS, Directorate
for Science and Technology Fact Sheet, 2007). The main functions transferred into this
directorate were programs from the DOE. Absorbed into this directorate of DHS were:
the chemical and biological national security and supporting programs; various nonproliferation research and development programs; microbial pathogen programs; and the
chemical and biological countermeasures program within the Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory (P.L 107-296, 2002). Apart from these programs three other
laboratories were transferred into this directorate: the Environmental Measurements
Laboratory, the Plum Island Animal Disease Center, and the National Bio-Weapons
Defense Analysis Center. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 also created a number of
new offices within the S&T directorate: Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects
Agency (HSARPA); the Homeland Security Science and Technology Advisory
Committee; and the Homeland Security Institute. These various programs and
laboratories focus on three main areas: intramural, industrial, and education (Under
Secretary McQueary, 2003).
National Bio-Weapons Defense Analysis Center
The National Bio-Weapons Defense Analysis Center was transferred to DHS
from DOD. In section 1708 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 Congress actually
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created the National Bio-Weapons Defense Analysis Center within the DOD. “There is
established in the Department of Defense a National Bio-Weapons Defense Analysis
Center, whose mission is to develop countermeasures to potential attacks by terrorists
using weapons of mass destruction” (P.L 107-296, 2002). However, in section 303 of the
Homeland Security Act of 2002 Congress transferred the center and its functions to the
DHS. The center was renamed to National Bio-Defense Analysis and Countermeasures
Center (NBACC). According to Dr. Albright, the Assistant Under Secretary for the S&T
directorate, the National Bio-Defense Analysis and Countermeasures Center is made up
of two centers; the Biological Threat Characterization Center and the National
Bioforensic Analysis Center (2005).
These two centers carry out the mission of threat awareness and surveillance and
detection. Specifically, Dr. Albright highlighted the mission of the National Bio-Defense
Analysis and Countermeasures Center is to “understand current and future biological
threats, assess vulnerabilities, and determine potential impacts to guide the research,
development, and acquisition of biodefense countermeasures such as detectors, drugs,
vaccines and decontamination technologies; and provide a national capability for
conducting forensic analysis of evidence from biocrimes and terrorism to attain a
“biological fingerprint” to identify perpetrators and determine the origin and method of
attack” (2005). In FY 2004, the Department completed the planning and conceptual
design of the National Bio-Defense Analysis and Countermeasures Center facility and
construction of the facility is planned for completion by the fourth quarter of FY 2008
(Albright, 2005). Due to the fact that the National Bio-Defense Analysis and
Countermeasures Center was created and transferred all within the same law and it was
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formed within the DHS it most likely did not experience role conflict similar to the other
agencies transferred into DHS. However, the employees of this new center may have
experienced role conflict because it was a new organization. In an audit by the OIG in
2004 one senior executive characterized the S&T directorate as a whole as a “startup
within a merger” (DHS, OIG-04-24, 2004). As stated previously, role conflict is a
common problem in mergers.
The same law that merged it into DHS created the mission of this agency,
therefore the mission did not change. All the roles for this agency would be new due to
the fact that it was a new agency. The general turmoil of starting up a new organization
can cause role ambiguity because employees are not quite sure of what their role is
specifically in relation to others in the organization. The expectations for this agency
were clearly laid out in the law and those expectations appear to be compatible with
DHS. However, within new organizations role conflict is often prevalent because there
can be incompatible expectations from those starting the organization and those at the
head of the organization. Role overload may also be present because in many new
organizations there are so many expectations for employees and the organization itself
that employees may feel overwhelmed. Mergers are ripe with role conflict, as are startups within mergers.
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
The Homeland Security Organization of the Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory (LLNL) was transferred into DHS as part of the collaboration between the
DHS and the DOE. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 states “in carrying out the
missions of the Department, the Secretary may utilize the Department of Energy national
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laboratories and sites through any one or more of the following methods, as the Secretary
considers appropriate: (A) A joint sponsorship arrangement referred to in subsection (b).
(B) A direct contract between the Department and the applicable Department of Energy
laboratory or site, subject to subsection (c). (C) Any ‘‘work for others’’ basis made
available by that laboratory or site. (D) Any other method provided by law” (P.L 107296, 2002). The Homeland Security Organization is a work for others agreement at the
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The Homeland Security
Organization (HSO) is “responsible for those LLNL activities explicitly transferred from
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)” (DOE, Operations Overview, 2004).
The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory works on a number of homeland security
programs, but there were two main programs transferred under the Homeland Security
Act of 2002; the chemical and biological countermeasures program and the nuclear and
radiological countermeasures program. Both of these programs were placed into the
Science and Technology directorate.
The mission of both of these programs did not change, they both “focus on
addressing the national need for technologies to quickly detect, identify, and mitigate the
use of chemical and biological threat agents against the U.S. civilian population, as well
as counter the threat of terrorist use of nuclear or radiological device in or near a US
population center” (DOE, Operations Overview, 2004). DHS became the funding center
for these programs and set the goals and priorities for what research should be conducted.
The mission of this organization did not change and they did not acquire new
roles or lose any roles. The expectations for this lab were compatible with DHS,
however the expectations from DHS were not clear. The lab had to be responsive to two
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separate entities and meet the expectations of the DOE and the DHS. This may cause
role conflict to occur among those who work at the Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory on the Homeland Security Organization. DOE and DHS were not the only
ones to set the requirements for the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory the
advisory committee also set requirements for the lab. Role ambiguity may also occur
because expectations are coming from so many organizations and the expectations from
each entity are different and may be incompatible. The relationship between DHS and
LLNL were not clear. These two organizations did share common goals.
Environmental Measurements Laboratory
The Environmental Measurements Laboratory (EML) was also transferred from
DOE to DHS. The mission of the Environmental Measurements Laboratory did not
change when it was transferred into DHS, the focus of the laboratory was and continues
to be to “measure and evaluate radiation in the environment” (Carafano, 2002). Dr.
Mitchell Erickson, Director of the Environmental Measurements Laboratory noted that
there was a change in mission and administrative relationship with the transition to DHS
(2006). According to Dr. Erickson “Environmental Measurements Laboratory rapidly
and expertly built upon its core competencies to meet the new mission of advancing and
applying the science and technology required for preventing, protecting against, and
responding to radiological and nuclear events in the service of Homeland and National
Security” (2006). The focus is subtle, but the shift in mission from not just detection, but
prevention, protection, and response could lead to role conflict because scientists now
have to focus on more than just detection. This subtle shift could also lead to role
overload.
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The mission of this agency changed with a subtle shift to include new roles. The
expectations for this lab are clear and appear to be compatible with the previous
expectation of just measuring and evaluating radiation in the environment. Employees
are trying to maintain a balance between the new roles of prevention, protection, and
response with their previous role of detection. It appears that there is balance between
the roles, however employees may experience role overload from the addition of the new
priorities. This role accumulation may have positive as well as negative effects on
employees. The lab and DHS did not have common goals before the merger, to ensure
that their goals were more on the same track the mission of the lab was altered. The
relationship between the lab and DHS appear to be clear. Due to the fact that the changes
were subtle and no employees altered where they worked, their organizational identity
would surround the lab itself and not the department within which it operated, i.e. DHS.
Plum Island
Plum Island Animal Disease Center was transferred from the USDA. Scientists
on the island conduct research on foreign animal diseases, which has continued.
According to the Agricultural Research Service (ARS), which has been responsible for
the research center since 1954, “in 2003 the DHS joined us on the island, taking
responsibility for the safety and security of the facility” (USDA, USDA and DHS
Working Together, 2005). Due to the fact that DHS only became responsible for the
safety and security of the center, the goals and the mission of the center did not change
and role conflict would not occur. However, adding the responsibility of the security of
the center could contribute to role overload of the S&T employees.
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The mission of the island did not change, however employees did take on new a
role. The expectations of what Plum Island does is compatible with DHS, however DHS
did not take over performing any research on the island or set any of the standards for
what research should be conducted. The expectations for DHS in this area are clear in
that they are maintaining security for the island; however who exactly within DHS is
performing that role was unclear. Role overload may result for those employees who
took over performing security on the island. Role overload for the employees is not all
bad, there are positives attached to having increased responsibility, however having too
many expectations on employees can lead to role conflict. The research performed on
Plum Island is extremely sensitive and providing security could be very complicated.
Security on the island has to be very precise to ensure that no diseases are transferred
from the island to the U.S. The relationship between DHS and Plum Island is not clear.
Due to the fact that no employees from Plum Island transferred to DHS there would not
be a need to ensure that a new organizational identity was established.
The Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency
In the intramural arena, the Science and Technology directorate “works closely
with scientists and engineers at our national laboratories and other government agencies
on technological innovations” (Under Secretary McQueary, 2003). The Homeland
Security Advanced Research Projects Agency funds research related to homeland
security through procurement contracts, grants, or cooperative agreements (Homeland
Security Advanced Research Project Agency Fact Sheet, 2003). The goal of the
Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency is to get prototypes to public or
private entities, businesses, development centers, and universities (P.L 107-296, 2002).
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Congress also required DHS to create University based centers “to establish a
coordinated, university-based system to enhance the Nation’s homeland security” (P.L
107-296, 2002). DHS designated these as centers for excellence and also funded various
fellow programs and scholarships. This is a brand new agency created by the Homeland
Security Act of 2002. The goals of this agency were compatible with DHS in that they
gave out funding for homeland security projects. The expectations of this agency were
clear and the relationship with DHS was clear. Since this is a new agency employees
would not associate with a previous organization. The problems that this agency might
encounter revolve around establishing its programs, hiring employees, and other
administrative tasks, and establishing an organizational identity.
The Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate
The Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) directorate
“analyzes and integrates terrorist threat information, mapping those threats against both
physical and cyber vulnerabilities to critical infrastructure and key assets, and
implementing actions that protect the lives of Americans, ensures the delivery of essential
government services, and protects infrastructure assets owned by US industry” (DHS,
OIG-04-13, 2004). The main objective of this directorate is to consolidate and analyze
intelligence information from a number of sources and share that information with local
and state officials. The agencies transferred into this directorate are: the National
Infrastructure Protection Center from the FBI, the National Communications System
from the DOD, the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office from the Department of
Commerce, and the Federal Computer Incident Response Center from the General
Services Administration.
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The National Infrastructure Protection Center
The National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) was transferred to the
Intelligence Analyze and Infrastructure Protection directorate from the FBI. The
National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) deals with cyber threats on
infrastructure within the U.S. The National Infrastructure Protection Center was
established in 1999 to “deter, detect, analyze, investigate, and provide warnings of cyber
threats and attacks on the critical infrastructures of the U.S., including illegal intrusions
into government and private sector computer networks. The National Infrastructure
Protection Center will also evaluate, acquire, and deploy computer equipment and cyber
tools to support investigations and infrastructure protection efforts” (Reno, 1999). This
center is a collaboration between many government agencies, the intelligence
community, and the private sector. When transferred into the DHS the National
Infrastructure Protection Center was separated into two different divisions. The
responsibilities were separated between those that dealt with the physical infrastructure
assessment and protection and those that dealt with the cyber infrastructure (Department
of Homeland Security Contact Information).
The mission of the center was not changed when it was merged into DHS and
they did not acquire new roles or lose any roles. The expectations for this center were
clear and with the separation into two divisions that could clarify the expectations of each
areas role further. However, that could also contribute to role conflict as well. The
expectations of this center were compatible with the IAIP. The relationship between this
center and DHS appear to be clear before the merger as well.
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However, a bigger problem that the National Infrastructure Protection Center had
to deal with is the personnel shortage. According to IG Ervin (2004) “when the National
Infrastructure Protection Center transferred into IAIP, personnel who actually left the FBI
and remained with the National Infrastructure Protection Center filled only 18 of the 307
full time employee positions targeted for transfer. The other 289 were vacant.” Due to
the fact that only 18 employees made the transfer role overload would be the biggest
concern and also creating the new organizational identity to ensure that those employees
do not leave the center.
National Communications System
The National Communications System (NCS) was transferred from the DOD into
the Intelligence Analysis and Infrastructure Protection directorate. This system was
created shortly after the Cuban Missile crisis to form a single unified communications
system to serve the President, the DOD, the intelligence community, the diplomatic
community, and civilian leaders (NCS, Background and History, 2007). The system was
established by President Kennedy and included linking the assets of six Departments,
improving, and extending the communications facilities and components of various
Federal agencies, focusing on interconnectivity, and survivability (NCS, Background and
History, 2007). President Regan broadened the National Communications System’s
capabilities in 1983 and expanded the membership of Federal agencies from six to
twenty-three (NCS, Background and History, 2007). President Bush expanded it again in
2007 by adding the Director of National Intelligence to the membership.
The mission of the National Communications System is “to assist the President,
the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, the Director of the Office
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of Science and Technology Policy and the Director of the Office of Management and
Budget in the exercise of the telecommunications functions and responsibilities set forth
in Section 2 of this Order” which includes wartime functions, emergency communication
functions, policy guidance for Federal telecommunication assets, and more (E.O. 12472,
2003). The mission of the National Communications System also includes, “the
coordination of the planning for and provision of national security and emergency
preparedness communications for the Federal government under all circumstances,
including crisis or emergency, attack, recovery, and reconstitution” (E.O 12472, 2003).
Each Department that is a member agency has specific responsibilities under the
Executive Order.
DHS is designated as the Executive Agent of the National Communications
System. As such they designate the manager of the National Communications System,
ensure that it is operating properly and is prepared to meet the needs of the Federal
government in case of an emergency. They also advise and assist state and local
governments to ensure that they have plans and procedures in place for identifying their
telecommunications needs in case of an emergency or national security situation, and
ensure to the maximum extent practicable that state and local government planning is
mutually supportive and consistent with the Federal government (E.O. 12472, 2003).
The mission of this system did not change and the center did not take on any new
roles. The expectations for this system were compatible with DHS before the merger and
are clear. The agency and DHS have common goals as well. This is another interagency
system where each department has a specific role to fulfill. The role of DHS is to ensure
that the system continues to run smoothly as well as assist state and local governments
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have plans in place for identifying their telecommunications needs should an emergency
arise. Due to the fact that the goals and responsibilities of each department are clearly
laid out in the Executive Order this would relieve role conflict that the employees may
experience within the merger. Employees in this organization would identify with the
NCS.
Federal Computer Incident Response Center
The Federal Computer Incident Response Center (FedCIRC) was transferred from
the GSA, manages computer security throughout the government. According to the
Acting Administrator in 2001 the Federal Computer Incident Response Center “is a
collaborative partnership drawing on the skills and resources within Government,
academia, and the private sector to address computer security related incidents” (Davis,
2001). The main mission of the Federal Computer Incident Response Center while in the
GSA was “to be the Federal civilian government's trusted focal point for computer
security incident reporting, sharing information on common vulnerabilities, and to
provide assistance with incident prevention and response” (Acting Commissioner
McDonald, 2002). Acting Commissioner McDonald (2002) noted that the Federal
Computer Incident Response Center performs four major activities for the federal
government. The first being it provides timely technical assistance to operators of agency
information systems regarding security incidents, including guidance on detecting and
handling information security incidents. The second major activity is compiling and
analyzing information about incidents that threaten information security. The third major
activity of the Federal Computer Incident Response Center is to inform operators of
agency information systems about current and potential information security threats and
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vulnerabilities and the last major activity of the Federal Computer Incident Response
Center is to consult with agencies or offices operating or exercising control of national
security systems. When transferred to DHS the major activities and mission of the
Federal Computer Incident Response Center didn’t change, however the Federal
Computer Incident Response Center itself changed.
DHS created the U.S Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) in 2003
with the Federal Computer Incident Response Center as the initial nucleus (DHS, Privacy
Impact Assessment, 2007). The fact that the mission and activities of the Federal
Computer Incident Response Center did not change would help alleviate some role
conflict. However, role conflict may still occur because of the change of culture and the
addition of tools to improve cyber-security and a new 24x7 Incident Handling Response
Center. Role conflict can also result from maintaining the partnerships with other federal
agencies, the private sector, and public institutions “that have homeland security
responsibilities for infrastructure sectors not covered by DHS” (DHS, OIG-04-13, 2004).
The mission of the FedCIRC did not change when it was transferred into DHS
however it did acquire the new role of being the nucleus for the U.S Computer
Emergency Readiness Team. The expectations of this agency were clear within DHS and
appear to be clear within this directorate, as this agency’s main focus was on mapping
cyber vulnerabilities and protecting that infrastructure. Employees in this directorate may
still identify with their previous organization. This agency also had to respond to a
number of audiences in that it is a collaborative partnership with academia and the private
sector. That could lead to role conflict among employees of this agency.
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Energy Security and Assurance Program
The Energy Security and Assurance Program (ESA) was transferred from the
DOE into the DHS. This program was designed to protect the Nation from severe energy
disruptions (H.R. Rep. No. 107-681, 2002). The Energy Security and Assurance program
is a single program with six main activities: energy disruptions and preparedness,
coordination with the private sector, state, and local government support, policy and
analysis support, criticality of energy assets, technology development and application,
and program direction (DOE, CFO, Budget Analysis, 2004). The program works with
the private sector, state and local governments, and the National Infrastructure Simulation
and Analysis Center (NISAC) to provide technical support during an emergency (S. Rep
No. 107-220, 2002). Due to the fact that this program works so closely with the National
Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center, Congress also transferred that center to
DHS in the Homeland Security Act of 2002.
The National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center “conducts advanced
modeling and simulation activities that examine the potential consequences from terrorist
attacks and natural disasters that impact critical infrastructure and key resources” (DHS,
Office of Infrastructure Protection Goals, 2007). When transferred into the DHS the
Energy Security and Assurance program’s mission did not change. Since both programs
were moved to the new department together Congress hoped that would ensure a
smoother transfer. “Keeping the Energy Security and Assurance program and National
Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center programs together will maintain program
coherence, since the Energy Security and Assurance program provides analysis and
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support for National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center” (House Committee
on Science and Technology, Republican Caucus, 2008).
The mission of these two agencies did not change when they were merged into
DHS. They also did not acquire new roles or lose any roles. The expectations for the
ESA program were compatible with DHS before being merged into it. The expectations
for the program did not change when it was merged within DHS. The relationship is
clear as well and due to the fact that the National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis
Center was merged into DHS as well, that will help employees identify with the new
organization quicker.
The Coast Guard
The Coast Guard experienced the most conflict of the agencies transferred into
DHS. The Coast Guard’s mission was greatly expanded under the Homeland Security
Act of 2002. The Coast Guard is a military organization, but was a part of the
Department of Treasury before being transferred into DHS. When merged with DHS the
Coast Guard was transferred in such a way that it reported directly to the Secretary. The
Coast Guard originally had six missions; marine safety, search and rescue, aids to
navigation, living marine resources (fisheries law enforcement), marine environmental
protection, and ice operations. Congress in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 has
deemed these as the Coast Guard’s ‘non-homeland security missions’. Congress added
five additional missions within the Homeland Security Act of 2002. These are deemed
the homeland security missions and consist of; ports, waterways and coastal security,
drug interdiction, migrant interdiction, defense readiness, and other law enforcement.
Both sets of missions were a part of the Coast Guard’s overall mission before the transfer
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into DHS; however Congress delineated them within the creation of DHS. Due to the
variety of missions and the amount of roles, both role overload and role conflict is a
concern. Congress has been extremely concerned about mission performance and has
addressed this question to the Commandant of the Coast Guard in a number of hearings.
Some in Congress have even attempted to pass legislation to ensure that the nonhomeland security missions do not take a back seat to the homeland security missions.
Senator Daniel Akaka (D-HI) introduced legislation on April 11, 2003 “to
guarantee the fulfillment of non-homeland security functions of the Coast Guard that
Americans rely on daily.” The legislation was titled the Non-Homeland Security Mission
Performance Act of 2003. The legislation did not focus solely on the Coast Guard,
however when introducing the legislation, Senator Akaka (D-HI) focused his attention on
the Coast Guard and the importance of the non-homeland security missions to Hawaii.
Senator Akaka stated that
“the establishment of the DHS created additional management challenges
and has fueled growing concerns that the performance of core, nonhomeland security functions will slip through the cracks. Just last week,
the Government Accounting Office (GAO) testified before the House
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure that the Coast Guard has
experienced a substantial decline in the amount of time spent on core
missions. Moreover, the GAO found that the Coast Guard lacks the
resources to reverse this trend. Coast Guard Commandant Thomas H.
Collins is quoted as saying that his agency has more business than it has
resources and is challenged like never before to do all that America wants
it to do” (2003).
The legislation would require that each agency that performs non-homeland
security missions submit a report on the agency with particular emphasis on the nonhomeland security missions (S.910, 2003). The reports should “provide an inventory of
the non-homeland security functions and identify the capabilities with respect to those
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functions; contain information relating to the roles, responsibilities, organizational
structure, capabilities, personnel assets, and annual budgets, specifically with respect to
the capabilities to accomplish non-homeland security functions without any
diminishment; contain information relating to whether any changes are required to the
roles, responsibilities, functions, organizational structure, projects, activities, and annual
fiscal resources to accomplish non-homeland security functions without diminishment;
and contain the strategy the Department will use for the performance of non -homeland
security functions and homeland security functions” (S.910, 2003). The legislation did
not make it out of committee; however the concern for the balance of missions within the
Coast Guard did not die.
In a 2004 report on the major management challenges within the DHS the OIG
found three major barriers to performing its non-homeland security missions. The first
barrier was the lack of a comprehensive and fully defined performance management
system (DHS, OIG-05-06, 2004). Without a proper performance management system the
Coast Guard is not able to adequately gauge the balance of its missions and how it is
performing the various missions. The second barrier facing the Coast Guard is the
continuing increase of workload demands as the Maritime Transportation Security Act of
2002 (MTSA) is implemented (DHS, OIG-05-06, 2004). The Maritime Transportation
Security Act of 2002 added another duty to the Coast Guard of conducting vulnerability
assessments of fifty identified seaports (Senate Report 107-64, 2001). This added
responsibility will continue to stretch the personnel of the Coast Guard, which is the third
barrier identified by the IG. The Coast Guard’s staff has declined in recent years, and its
infrastructure has been taxed to the point where there are questions about the aging fleet
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being able to meet all the new challenges of its mission. In 2005 Commandant Admiral
Thomas Collins testified before the House Subcommittee on Economic Security,
Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity regarding these barriers and other questions
about the Homeland Security missions of the post-9/11 Coast Guard.
This subcommittee wanted to ensure that the Coast Guard had the resources
needed to balance the missions of homeland security and all the other missions that they
were responsible for before joining DHS. During the hearing Admiral Collins (2005)
noted that 45 to 46 percent of the total Coast Guard budget base is going towards
homeland security missions as described within the Homeland Security Act of 2002.
However, he did not believe that the other missions were being neglected. In fact he
highlighted throughout the hearing that the Coast Guard is a military, multi-mission,
maritime service. That is not to say that Admiral Collins believed that the additional
missions had not added strain to the Coast Guard. “These and other critical roles have
imparted a tremendous challenge on Coast Guard men and women” (The Homeland
Security Missions of Post 9/11 Coast Guard, 2005). Examining the statement it appears
that Admiral Collins does not believe that the additional missions have lead to role
conflict among the employees of the Coast Guard because even prior to the addition of
the homeland security missions the Coast Guard was a multi-mission service. “The
competencies necessary to do a variety of missions are built into that platform in the
amount of people --. Not everyone knows every mission. We have multi-mission ships
and multi-mission planes. A ship could be doing a search and rescue mission in the
morning and could be interdicting drugs in the afternoon, which is frequently the case, by
the way. And I would submit if you look at mission area by mission area by mission
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area, our mission performance has been extraordinary and it hasn’t taken a back seat
anywhere” (The Homeland Security Missions of Post 9/11 Coast Guard, 2005).
However, the question of resources and balance of missions still lingers.
In 2006 while preparing the FY 2007 budget the Congressional Research Service,
which provides policy and legal analysis to committees and members of both the House
and Senate, submitted an analysis of the budget request for the Coast Guard which
highlighted that 54 percent of the requested budget was for homeland security missions
(O’Rourke, 2006). The Coast Guard will always have many missions and it appears they
The mission of the Coast Guard changed dramatically with the merger into DHS
and they acquired a number of new roles. The biggest concern within Congress for the
Coast Guard is how they will be able to balance all the missions that they have. Role
overload could be present amongst employees. Due to the fact that they are a multimission organization and every employee does not have knowledge of every mission
could help to alleviate some of the negative consequences of role overload. The Coast
Guard has worked to ensure that employees do not experience too much role overload by
making units mission specific. Expectations are clearly laid out for the Coast Guard and
appear to be compatible with the DHS before they were merged. The relationship with
the DHS before the merger is not clear until Congress identified the new roles for the
Coast Guard. The organizational identity of being a member of the Coast Guard would
overrule the identity of being a member of DHS.
The Secret Service
The Secret Service began in the late 1860’s to investigate the counterfeiting of
U.S. currency. Over the years their mission was expanded to include protection of the
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President, Vice-President, and other important political figures, cyber and
telecommunications fraud, and other crimes that involve fraud and financial institutions
(Secret Service, 2008). The Secret Service handles security at events that are deemed as
National Special Security Events by the President or the Secretary of DHS. They also
have a threat assessment center, which provides Federal, State, and local law enforcement
agencies with training, research, and consultation on complex threat assessment (P.L.
106-544, 2000). When the Secret Service was transferred into DHS it was transferred as
a distinct entity that reports directly to the Secretary of DHS (P.L. 107-296, 2002).
Due to the fact that the Secret Service was transferred as a whole and reports
directly to the Secretary and the mission of the organization did not change, therefore role
conflict is lessened. The Secret Service did acquire new roles in that it was now
designated to assist at National Special Security Events. Before merging into DHS it is
not clear how the Secret Service is compatible with DHS. The expectations for the
service are clear in that they did not change. Due to the fact that the service was
transferred as a whole, most employees would identify with the service and not with the
Treasury Department. However, role conflict may result from the many varied priorities
within the Secret Service. However, since they have managed these various missions for
a number of years, it seems that is not having a negative effect on the organization.
Conflict within the Directorates
The agencies are not the only organizations within the DHS that experienced
conflict from the merger. The directorates also had a number of conflicts. Many of the
sources of conflicts within the directorates are similar to the conflicts within the agencies.
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In some cases, the conflicts within the directorates had a direct effect on the conflict
within the agencies.
The agencies transferred into the Border and Transportation Security directorate
were placed there because management believed there was mission overlap between
protecting the U.S by enforcing immigration and customs laws, as well as overseeing the
border. “The men and women of these various agencies carry out their responsibilities
diligently, but they operate under a fragmented system. For example, both INS and
Customs Service conduct criminal investigations. The result is that too frequently,
investigators from both agencies are pursuing similar cases or even the exact same ones”
(DHS, Border Reorganization Speech, 2003). To enhance efficiency and create a more
seamless unit at the border, DHS created two bureaus that would focus on the border in
different ways.
The Bureau of Customs and Border Protection would focus on border protection
and inspections. The Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement would focus on
investigation and law enforcement. According to DHS, “these two new bureaus will
break down barriers to communication and provide a direct line of authority to the
Department's headquarters and give homeland security employees a clear mission. It will
join the investigators with the investigators and the inspectors with the inspectors to
capitalize on expertise and resources” (DHS Press Release, 2003). However, this change
ended up splitting many of the agencies that were merged into this directorate thus, role
conflict may have actually been created by altering the respective missions of the
agencies involved. Congressman Rogers (R-AL) chaired a Congressional hearing
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concerning these bureaus in 2005 and questioned whether the means of reorganization
accomplished its stated goal.
The reorganization charged Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) agents with
carrying out the duties and functions formerly carried out by three separate agencies and
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents with the enforcement of both the
laws of immigration and customs. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) was
rearranged to contain the Office of Detention and Removal, the Office of Intelligence, the
Federal Protection Service, and the Federal Air Marshals (CBP and ICE Hearing, 2005).
Congressman Rogers (2005) noted during the hearing concerning Customs and Border
Patrol and Immigration and Customs Enforcement, that “we have heard of concerns that
inspectors are not receiving investigative support as readily as before the reorganization
and that reorganization may have created bureaucratic walls that impede effective and
efficient communication and information sharing” (CBP and ICE Hearing, 2005).
This directorate has to respond to many different audiences with different needs
and expectations for how to accomplish their jobs, which is the largest contributor to role
conflict. This directorate also must rely on other agencies to fulfill a number of
expectations and this can also contribute to role conflict because each agency has an
opinion on how the job should be accomplished. However, because the goals of the
directorate did not change, but were clarified this could help alleviate role conflict.
During Secretary Ridge’s swearing in before Congress he stated “under the
Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate in the new Department, we will
strengthen our relationship with first responders and partner with the states, cities, and
counties that manage and fund them. We will work with Congress to provide them with
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the resources they need, beginning with the President's First Responder Initiative, which
offered a thousand-percent increase in funding to equip, train, and drill first responders to
meet a conventional attack or one involving a weapon of mass destruction” (Ridge,
2003). However, the Office of Domestic Preparedness, which is the main office for
many grant programs, was placed within the Border and Transportation Security
directorate. The Emergency Preparedness Response directorate modified the focus of the
various agencies and programs that were transferred into it from a singular focus to an
all-hazards focus. These changes led to conflict within the directorate as well as between
the programs, which had to rely on their old agencies for assistance and direction.
The biggest source of conflict within this directorate is the reliance on other
Departments. This directorate contains two interagency teams in which DHS only
manages the teams when there is an emergency. When the teams are not needed they
work within their home departments. A separate source of conflict within this directorate
is the fact that FEMA is the backbone, however grants for preparedness and response
were placed into the Border and Transportation directorate. This conflict was rectified
after a few years, but this separation of roles into two directorates would affect how
employees perform their duties.
The main focus of this directorate is collaborating with other government
agencies to ensure that research and development pertinent to homeland security occurs
at a rapid pace. In 2005 management of this directorate reported to the Homeland
Security Science and Technology Advisory Committee (HSSTAC) that “S&T continues
to emphasize the Directorate’s role in interacting with other federal departments and
agencies. Over the last year, S&T has worked with the Office of Science and Technology
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Policy, the Homeland Security Council, the National Security Council, the Office of
Management and Budget, and the Office of the Vice President to begin a governmentwide effort to coordinate homeland security R&D efforts, as Congress directed in the
Homeland Security Act of 2002” (HSSTAC Minutes, 2005). The Homeland Security
Science and Technology Advisory Committee was created as an advisory committee to
the S&T directorate through the Homeland Security Act of 2002.
The committee was made up of twenty members with differing backgrounds from
emergency responders to representatives of citizen groups (P.L 107-296, 2002). The
group was created with the mission to serve as a source of independent, scientific, and
technical planning advice for the Under Secretary for Science and Technology (DHS,
Homeland Security Science and Technology Advisory Committee, 2004). The group
was also given a time limit for its mission, three years. The committee took time to get
set-up and didn’t have their first meeting until February 2004. Their termination date
was January 2005; however they did continue to meet until the end of 2005. The
committee has not met since that time, during the meetings the S&T directorate continued
to emphasize their work collaborating with other government agencies.
The biggest contributors to conflict within the S&T directorate are the
administrative and logistical issues of managing the goals and priorities of the multiple
audiences that they have to interact with; internal, external, and educational. In 2004 the
OIG highlighted that many of the administrative and logistical issues are the result of the
dependence of the S&T directorate on other federal agencies for services (DHS, OIG-0424, 2004). In 2006 Jay Cohen, Under Secretary of the S&T directorate realigned the
directorate. The directorate was separated into six divisions that are focused on specific
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areas of research (DHS, Science and Technology Organization, 2007, with each division
serving a number of customers within the Department.
The borders and maritime security division develops and transitions tools and
technologies that improve the security of our Nation's borders and waterways, without
impeding the flow of commerce and travelers. The chemical and biological division
works to increase the Nation's preparedness against chemical and biological threats
through improved threat awareness, advanced surveillance and detection, and protective
countermeasures. The command, control, and interoperability division develops
interoperable communication standards and protocols for emergency responders, cyber
security tools for protecting the integrity of the Internet, and automated capabilities to
recognize and analyze potential threats. The explosives division develops the technical
capabilities to detect, interdict, and lessen the impacts of non-nuclear explosives used in
terrorist attacks against mass transit, civil aviation, and critical infrastructure. The human
factors division applies the social and behavioral sciences to improve detection, analysis,
and understanding and response to homeland security threats. The infrastructure and
geophysical division focuses on identifying and mitigating the vulnerabilities of the
seventeen critical infrastructure and key assets that keep our society and economy
functioning. This is the second realignment in four years. According to testimony from
Under Secretary Cohen (2006) the goals of the directorate did not change, but were
clarified.
The mission of the directorate did not change, however the amount of change in
such a short period of time can contribute to role ambiguity. Also, this directorate has to
respond to many different audiences with different needs and expectations for how to
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accomplish their jobs, which is the largest contributor to role conflict. Many of the
agencies within this directorate did not take on new roles; however with the change to
being responsive to so many varied audiences they may have too many projects to
manage. This directorate also must rely on other agencies to fulfill a number of
expectations this can also contribute to role conflict because each agency has an opinion
on how the job should be accomplished. However, because the goals of the directorate
did not change, but were clarified this could help alleviate role conflict. Also, the
realignment could help the agencies balance the various roles that they are filling because
now they understand who they can ask for role clarity if need be.
The Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) directorate does
not collect any intelligence it only analyzes what information it is given. The National
Strategy for Homeland Security that was published in July 2002 stated that, “the CIA is
specifically responsible for gathering and analyzing all information regarding potential
terrorist threats abroad. The proposed IAIP Division within the DHS would be able not
only to access and analyze homeland security information, but also to translate it into
warning and protective action.”
Due to the fact that the IAIP was not collecting any intelligence just analyzing it,
role conflict can result from the dependence on other agencies and centers, programs that
overlap the role of the IAIP. Early in 2003 President Bush directed the Director of
Central Intelligence, the Director of the FBI, and the Secretaries of DHS and the DOD to
create a Terrorist Threat Integration Center (White House, 2003). The head of this new
center would report to the Director of Central Intelligence. According to Inspector
General Skinner (2005), “with the creation of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center
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under the Director of Central Intelligence and the Terrorist Screening Center under the
Director of the FBI, the role and responsibilities of IAIP for intelligence collection,
analysis, and dissemination has been abated. Creation of the new Director of National
Intelligence position makes the DHS intelligence coordination role even more uncertain,
calling for prompt clarification of federal lines of authority in this area.” While the role
conflict may not affect each individual agency that was transferred into this directorate,
the lack of a clear role for the directorate would filter down to the individual agencies.
The IAIP also had a lot of turnover of key management positions and also had to deal
with space problems along with the rest of DHS (DHS, OIG-04-13, 2004). Both of these
problems can lead to role conflict among the agencies that were transferred into the IAIP.
Similar to the other directorates, the agencies that were transferred into the
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate had to collaborate with all
the other agencies that were collecting the intelligence as well as the public. Role
conflict can result from this collaboration because the expectations between the agencies
that collect the intelligence and the public’s thirst for information may be incompatible.
This directorate had some new programs created within it, which could contribute to role
conflict because employees must learn the new program and manage the expectations of
all those utilizing the program. Agencies within this directorate also had to deal with a
personnel shortage. This would contribute to the role overload of the employees who
work within these agencies. Role overload is the biggest problem within this directorate.
Without the responsibility of collection, people may experience the positive
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effects of role overload as well as the negative, but this can be bad for the overall organization as people may leave because
they feel overburdened and now they have even more skills to market themselves with.
Table 1: Sources of Role Conflict within the Agencies
Agency

Sources of Conflict

Previous
Dept.

Reporting Line

Under
Secretary for
Border and
Transportation
Directorate
Secretary of
DHS

Stated
Mission
Change

Reliance
on other
agencies
for
Admin

Identify
with

Number of
Audiences

Role
Ambiguity

Role
Conflict

Role
Overload

Federal
Protective
Service

Yes

Yes

FPS

4

No

Yes

No

Government
Service
Agency

Coast Guard

Yes

No

Coast
Guard

5

No

No

Yes

DOT

Immigration
and
Naturalization
Services

Yes

No

INS

4

Possibly

No

No

Justice

U.S. Customs
Service

Yes

No

Customs

4

No

Yes

No

Treasury

Under
Secretary for
Border and
Transportation
Directorate
Under
Secretary for
Border and
Transportation
Directorate

FEMA

Yes

No

FEMA

4

Yes

No

No

Independent
Agency

Environmental
Measures
Laboratory

Yes

No

EML

4

No

Yes

Yes

Department
of Energy

Agricultural
Quarantine
Inspection

No

Yes

AQI

5

Yes

Yes

No

USDA

Office of
Domestic
Preparedness

No

Yes

ODP

6

No

Yes

No

Justice

Strategic
National
Stockpile

No

Yes

HHS

5

No

No

No

Health and
Human
Services

Interagency
Teams

No

Yes

Organizations in
which they
work

Varied dependent
on the type
of
emergency

No

Yes

No

Department
of Energy
and Justice

Lawrence
Livermore
National
Laboratory

No

Yes

LLNL

5

Yes

No

No

Department
of Energy
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Under
Secretary for
Emergency
Preparedness
and Response
Directorate
Under
Secretary for
Science and
Technology
Directorate
Under
Secretary for
Border and
Transportation
Directorate
Under
Secretary for
Border and
Transportation
Directorate
Under
Secretary for
Emergency
Preparedness
and Response
Directorate
Under
Secretary for
Emergency
Preparedness
and Response
Directorate
Under
Secretary for
Science and
Technology

Directorate

Plum Island

No

Yes

Plum
Island

5

No

No

Yes

USDA

National
Domestic
Preparedness
Office

No

No

Organizations in
which they
work

11

Yes

No

No

FBI (Justice)

TSA

No

No

DHS

4

Yes

No

No

DOT

National
Disaster Medical
System

No

No

Organizations in
which they
work

Varied dependent
on the type
of
emergency

No

No

No

Health and
Human
Services

National BioWeapons
Defense
Analysis Center

No

No

DHS

4

No

No

No

DOD

Under
Secretary for
Science and
Technology
Directorate

National
Infrastructure
Protection
Center

No

No

NIPC

4

No

Yes

No

FBI (Justice)

Under
Secretary for
Science and
Technology
Directorate
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Under
Secretary for
Science and
Technology
Directorate
Under
Secretary for
Emergency
Preparedness
and Response
Directorate
Under
Secretary for
Border and
Transportation
Directorate
Under
Secretary for
Emergency
Preparedness
and Response
Directorate

National
Communication
Systems

No

No

Organizations in
which they
work

Many

No

No

No

DOD

Federal
Computer
Incident
Response Center

No

No

FedCIRC

7

No

Yes

No

Government
Service
Agency

Energy Security
Assurance
Program

No

No

DOE

6

No

No

No

Department
of Energy

Federal Law
Enforcement
Training Center

No

No

FLETC

4

No

No

No

Treasury

Secret Service

No

No

Secret
Service

4

No

No

No

Treasury

Under
Secretary for
Intelligence
Analysis and
Infrastructure
Protection
Under
Secretary for
Intelligence
Analysis and
Infrastructure
Protection
Under
Secretary for
Intelligence
Analysis and
Infrastructure
Protection
Under
Secretary for
Border and
Transportation
Directorate
Secretary of
DHS

*Reliance on other agencies for admin, denotes that these agencies rely on their previous department for administrative
support.
*The identify with column denotes which agency or department the employees of the agency that merged into DHS would
identify with.
*Audiences for all agencies are Congress, the President, the American public, and the DHS administration; therefore each
agency began with four audiences.
* Reporting line denotes who within DHS the head of an agency reports to.
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In Table 1, I have collapsed information about the conflict within the DHS
agencies to indicate how role ambiguity, conflict, and overload are related to mission
change and reporting lines. Examining the data only the border agencies, the Office of
Domestic Preparedness, the Coast Guard, Environmental Measures Laboratory, and
FEMA had their missions changed. Most of these agencies only had a slight change in
their mission with terrorism added as another area of focus. Therefore, if the mission of
the organization outlines its purpose and goals it is safe to say that the majority of the
agencies merged into DHS did not experience role conflict because the expectation of
their agency did not change. If it had changed the mission would have been altered.
Having a mission altered is not the only reason that agencies may have
experienced role conflict. Seven agencies appear to be at risk or are at risk to experience
role conflict. The main reason that these agencies are more vulnerable to role conflict is
due to the fact that their organizational culture and identity remain with their old
organization or the organizations in which the employees work. This is especially
evident in the interagency teams, which are only managed by DHS in specific emergency
situations. In these situations specifically however the teams are used to working with a
variety of agencies, as that is the nature of these teams. Another contributing factor in
role conflict is whether or not the agencies were compatible with DHS before merging.
This is the case with the Federal Protective Services, the compatibility between these
agencies were not obvious because of the job that FPS was performing before merging
into DHS. Its mission was altered when it was added into DHS and this made it more
compatible, however it also leads to over conflict.

Only three agencies had roles added to their current roles. The Coast Guard had
the most roles added to its already full mission. This resulted in them having eleven roles
total. The Environmental Measures laboratory added three new roles to their mission to
total five roles for the employees of the lab. Both of these agencies added
complementary roles. However, even complementary roles can result in role overload.
Employees in these two agencies may have experienced some of the benefits of role
overload such as privileges, status enhancement, and personal enhancement. Plum Island
also added another role; however not knowing who exactly within DHS is performing the
security at Plum Island it is difficult to determine who exactly may experience role
overload. However, role overload may result from more than just an addition of a role
for the organization. Employees may have taken on new roles even though the mission
of the organization did not change because it was needed to help fulfill their original
mission. In these situations it is more likely that the roles would be compatible and
employees would experience the positive effects of role overload.
According to the data, seven agencies are susceptible to experience role
ambiguity. This is the case for many of the directorates as well. Some of the causes of
role ambiguity are rapid organizational change and organizational complexity. All of the
agencies within DHS experienced these two factors. In particular the Immigration and
Naturalization Service that was separated into two different agencies within DHS, but not
all of the pieces of INS made the merger into DHS and other pieces went to other
Departments. FEMA was in a similar situation as INS in that the agency was separated
into a number of pieces. The Agricultural Inspection Service had to rely on USDA to set
some of the expectations for their job performance, while DHS was actually managing
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their performance. The Lawrence Livermore laboratory was in a similar situation as AQI
in that DHS only had oversight of the Homeland Security Organization, but the
Department of Energy also set expectations for the lab overall which would affect those
employees who work within the Homeland Security Organization. The National
Domestic Preparedness Office had to respond to the most audiences, the reason being that
eleven offices were members of this office. This office did not have any dedicated staff
when it was merged into DHS, however it was placed within the Office of Domestic
Preparedness, which experienced a lot of organizational change over the last five years.
The Transportation Security Agency was set up quickly after September 11th and this
rapid organizational change combined with having to hire so many employees so quickly
would lead to role ambiguity within this agency.
Looking at the agencies that experienced role ambiguity a number of them still
identified with their old organization. The INS most likely identified with their previous
organization, as did many of the border agencies because agencies in uniform tend to
have a stronger identification within that unit. One could believe that it is because they
have to protect each other while on duty and not just perform their jobs. This is one
reason that the Coast Guard and the Secret Service would most likely identify more with
the agency as a whole and not DHS. Establishing that new organizational identity in
which employees see themselves as employees of DHS is a big feat for DHS due to the
fact that they are not all in the same building and creating that organizational culture
takes time without a shared space.
Some of the smaller agencies within DHS may have benefited from their size.
This is due to the fact that consensus among audiences is more likely within smaller
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agencies. However, one of the largest agencies, the Secret Service, may not have
experienced role conflict, but that was most likely because their role was not altered
when they were merged within DHS. The Federal Law Enforcement Center is another
agency that appears to not have experienced any conflict related to its role and that is
most likely because their role did not change and was not altered.
Most of the agencies within DHS did not experience conflict related to their roles
or have roles added to their mission. However, the conflict that they were experiencing
related to the merger in general would have put a strain on fulfilling their roles. Mergers
are stressful to go through and employees had to learn how to operate in a new
environment resulting from the merger even though their workspace did not change.
Undergoing so much change in such a short period of time with such high expectations
placed upon an organization, there is no wonder why so many of the agencies merged
into DHS experienced conflict and did not perform their jobs one hundred percent out of
the gate.
There is no easy way to resolve role conflict, however there are some ways in
which employees can try to lessen the affects of it. One of the first ways to resolve role
conflict is to interpenetrate the new role throughout the other roles that the agency is
currently occupying. This would be easier for agencies like the Environmental
Measurements Lab in which their new role only altered their current role slightly. The
Coast Guard appears to utilize compartmentalization to resolve their role conflict. There
are multi-mission ships that fill particular roles. When an employee is on that ship, the
mission is clear and the employee can fulfill a given role to help the mission succeed.
Congress with the passage of the Hurricane Katrina Relief Act helped FEMA merge
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missions together, so that they would in turn focus again on all hazards and not just one
area. This act also put all of the roles back within FEMA when originally they were
separated out. This would also help to alleviate the role conflict within the Office of
Domestic Preparedness, because it was placed within FEMA after becoming the Office of
Grants and Training in 2005. Within the Border agencies the easiest way for them to
relieve their role conflict would be to alternate between the given roles. Focus on the one
area in which they have been placed and try to forget the other roles that they were
fulfilling before the merger. The only other option for the agencies within DHS to
resolve their role conflict is to altercast the roles, and try to reorient the audiences role
expectations. This seems to be difficult with the number of audiences that some agencies
within DHS had to deal with, however it is not impossible.
In Sum
Agencies merged into DHS had a heavy mission to fulfill. They had to work to
prevent another terrorist attack. Reduce America’s vulnerability to another terrorist
attack and deter another terrorist attack. Protect the American public against another
terrorist attack and respond to threats and all hazards, be they man-made or natural.
Ensure that the borders are safe, welcoming lawful immigrants and visitors, while
promoting the free flow of commerce. All the while carrying out their previous mission,
without diminishment. The majority of agencies merged into DHS did not have their
stated mission altered. However, many agencies experienced conflict over the
expectations that they had been given before becoming a part of DHS and the
expectations that they were given after. Agencies also needed the expectations to be
compatible with DHS and for it to make sense of where they were placed within the new
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department. The agencies combined together to form DHS had to work quickly to create
new organizational identities and ensure that employees identified with the particular
agency and not the old department that they were a part of.
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Chapter 4 Conclusion
Since its inception the DHS has continually changed. Due to all those changes,
employees may not understand their role in the larger organization. This chapter recaps
the problems that DHS has encountered since it was formed, how role theory explains
some of the problems that it has encountered, limitations of this study, and areas for
further study. To begin, this chapter will examine more changes that the DHS
experienced with a change in upper management.
In 2005 DHS underwent another significant change; Secretary Michael Chertoff
replaced Secretary Tom Ridge. Shortly upon his arrival Secretary Chertoff undertook a
Second-Stage Review to systematically evaluate the Department’s operations, policies
and structures (Chertoff, 2005). The review was concluded in the summer of 2005 and
Secretary Chertoff announced his new six point agenda to employees and Congress. The
second stage review brought together 18 action teams with over 250 DHS employees.
The action teams were asked to evaluate specific operation and policy issues. Opinions
were also sought from DHS partners of local, State, and tribal governments. One of the
goals of the second stage review was to “set a clear national strategy and design an
architecture in which separate roles and responsibilities for security are fully integrated
among public and private stakeholders” (Chertoff, 2005).
The six-point agenda “is structured to guide the department in the near term and
result in changes that will: 1) increase overall preparedness, particularly for catastrophic
events; 2) create better transportation security systems to move people and cargo more
securely and efficiently; 3) strengthen border security and interior enforcement and
reform immigration processes; 4) enhance information sharing with our partners; 5)
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improve DHS financial management, human resource development, procurement and
information technology; and 6) realign the DHS organization to maximize mission
performance” (DHS, Department Six-Point Agenda, 2008). Chertoff (2005) recognized
that “modest, but essential course corrections regarding the organization will yield big
dividends.” Even a modest change of the mission can lead to role conflict as people may
not understand how their role fulfills the mission and how they contribute to the
professed vision of the Department.
Role Ambiguity
Role ambiguity is the result of a lack of information regarding expectations for a
role. As stated previously role ambiguity can be created by organizational complexity,
rapid organizational change, and managerial philosophies. DHS has experienced all of
these over the past five years. Examining each agencies expectations before merging
with DHS and then after to see if it appears to be compatible with DHS, it seems that
most of the expectations were clear. It also appears that expectations for the majority of
agency’s merged into DHS were compatible. The number one lack of clarity for
expectations is to whom employees should direct questions. Many of these agencies
were still relying on their previous department for administrative tasks it was not clear
who was setting the expectations and whose expectations employees should be fulfilling.
The agencies that had to rely on their former Departments the most were, the Agricultural
Quarantine Inspection, the Strategic National Stockpile and the National Disaster
Medical System, and the Federal Protective Services.
Employees may also have contradictory expectations for the department. They
may expect certain tasks to be accomplished in a specific way and they are not being
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fulfilled that way anymore because the new Department has taken over that
responsibility. It appears that role ambiguity is the biggest problem within DHS since
many of the missions of the agencies merged into DHS did not change and it appears that
role conflict is not as present as role ambiguity. The ramifications of role ambiguity are
interference with mission accomplishment and performance. This can also lead to
employee turnover, which DHS cannot afford.
Role Overload
Role overload occurs when an organization or individual takes on too many roles.
Role overload has negative and positive effects. It appears that the majority of agencies
merged into DHS had balance among the new roles that they assumed. However, the
Coast Guard should be very mindful of role overload, as should the National
Infrastructure Protection Center. Only a limited number of agencies took on new roles
and it seems that many have built upon their previous roles to try to alleviate role
overload for their employees. To help alleviate both role conflict and role overload
employees should try to merge any of these roles together. If that is not possible they
may be able to alternate between the two roles. However, employees cannot sustain that
for a long period of time as it can lead to many other conflicts. One last resolution for
role conflict or role overload is to ask for clarification of the roles by those who created
it. This is not always possible, but it is an excellent way to alleviate role conflict and
overload.
Due to the fact that DHS has had difficulty setting up a national headquarters and
the majority of the agencies have remained in their previous locations, DHS needs to
work to create an organizational identity. One way to do that is to try to take over the
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administrative tasks that the other departments are currently doing. Secretary Ridge
began to take the human resources and accounting systems and merge them together to
create one system for all employees. This is a daunting task, but this will greatly
contribute to creating a DHS organizational identity. Secretary Chertoff has also helped
to create the new identity with his second stage alignment. When he became Secretary he
tried to ensure that the alignment would help employees reduce some of the bureaucracy
that they had encountered when DHS was first created.
One of the biggest sources of conflict was the manner in which the Department
was created. All of the agencies heard rumor and speculation surrounding the creation
the new Department, which most likely contributed to employees not wanting to make
the transition. Another problem that still has not been addressed was the realignment of
Congress. DHS still has to respond to an exorbitant amount of Congressional
committees. According to Veronique De Rugy (2006) “Even after the combination of
more than two dozen agencies, committee chairs have been unwilling to relinquish much
of their jurisdiction over the 22 agencies and activities transferred to DHS. As a result,
last year alone the leaders of DHS had to appear before 88 congressional committees and
subcommittees.” This takes up significant time when trying to get a Department up and
running. Another source of conflict is the territorial issues that occur within Congress
and those agencies that became a part of DHS. DHS felt this most acutely when
employees did not make the transition with their agency.
The turf wars are still ongoing with regards to homeland security funding. One of
the main reasons for creating DHS was to make a one-stop shop for states and local
governments to get grant funding. “Conversely, much homeland security spending takes
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place outside of the department. The total amount directed to homeland security activities
in fiscal year 2006 is roughly $50 billion. But departments other than DHS will spend
$23 billion of that. Not surprisingly, a large portion--$9.5 billion--goes to the Department
of Defense. But other funding decisions are more curious. Why, for instance, are the
Environmental Protection Agency, the Commerce Department, and the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration receiving homeland security funds (De Rugy,
2006)?”
Some of these agencies had never worked together before merging to create this
new Department. They had to establish programs and processes for working together.
They needed to establish their organizational culture for working on new projects and
expectations for the projects. They had to establish ‘this is the way we do things around
here’ which is time consuming and can have an effect of how someone performs their
role within the organization.
Another source of conflict is that some roles were emphasized over others. As
many stated before 2005 FEMA focused on terrorism and forgot about natural disasters,
that when the hurricanes struck in 2005 people were not prepared to deal with it. Another
example is TSA. Many have stated that air transportation has been emphasized over all
other transportation that other forms of transportation are not as secure. Another agency
where this may be apparent is the Coast Guard, as evidenced by the testimony before
Congress.
Another area of conflict is the amount of audiences that DHS had to report to.
Many of the agencies had to answer to DHS, Congress, the President, the American
people, and their previous Department. With more stakeholders there is less flexibility in
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how the agencies perform their roles. There is also less ability to make small changes
and adjustments to their roles. Also, there are more opportunities for expectations to be
conflicted or not clear, which leads to role conflict and ambiguity. This appears to be a
big problem for the administration of grants. The states and local governments want
funds to pay for responders, but Congress does not allow this in the legislation. Congress
and the states want the grants distributed quickly, however there are a number of checks
in place to ensure that the money is distributed correctly. Parts of the country want the
grants distributed on the basis of risk, however Congress wants to ensure that all parts of
the country feel safe and get an allocation of money, so they added formulas to the grants.
There are also a number of coordination issues and how to get the money distributed
quickly and fairly as well as ensure that the states and local governments get answers to
their questions and understand more about what they should be utilizing the funds for. A
lack of consensus among the audiences can be very daunting because employees may not
understand the expectations of all the audiences.
Lessons Learned
This is not the first agency that was created in this frankensteinian way. One that
was very similar in size to DHS was the Department of Defense. FEMA was also created
in a similar fashion. The DOD merger is considered successful now, however it took a
number of years for the agencies combined to learn to function together as a team. Even
after a number of years DOD employees still encounter some problems working together,
however their roles are clearly laid out and most employees understand their role within
the organization. The DHS should create a way to explain each agencies role within the
larger organization and how employees fit within that organization chart. Employees
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need to understand how their role works to fulfill the mission of the agency and how that
agency works to fulfill the mission of the larger department.
One lesson for future mergers of this size with this amount of bureaucracy is to a
have meeting with the employees who will be merged together before the merger to
ensure that they understand the expectations for their organization within the new
organization. This will help employees to clarify any role conflict or ambiguity. A
dialogue between all employees that will be merged together would also be good for
employees to air their concerns and address any organizational conflicts before they
occur. A dialogue would also be a good place for management to address any rumors
that may be circulating and ensure that employees have factual information about what to
expect with the merger.
Another lesson for future mergers is to clarify the roles of each agency to be
merged within the organization by writing clear mission statements. Many of the
agencies within the DHS did not have their stated mission altered, however almost all of
their missions changed. The majority of agencies had to change their focus to include
terrorism as well as their previous focus. Each agency needs to understand how to
achieve balance between the previous focus and the additional focus of terrorism.
Another lesson learned from this merger is the consolidation of Congressional
committees. This was recommended when by the U.S Commission on National
Security/21st Century in early 2001 when they recommended the creation of a department
focused on homeland security. DHS will hopefully work as well as DOD does currently,
but it took a number of years for DOD to obtain a level of cohesion. DHS is still learning
its way and getting used to working together. Mergers and acquisitions take between five
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and seven years in the private sector, DHS has been in existence for five years already
and is performing progressively better.
Limitations of the study
There are a number of limitations to this study. The first being that there was no
first hand data sought by employees of DHS. Further study should be performed in this
area. There are a number of tools that measure role conflict, which could be given to
actual DHS employees to examine how much role conflict, ambiguity, and overload they
are experiencing. One should determine if employees still identify with their old
department or DHS.
The second limitation to this study is the problems and lack of consensus among
role theorists over the theory itself. Biddle states (1986), “confusion and malintegration
persist in role theory. Authors continue to differ over definitions for the role concept,
over assumptions they make about roles, and over explanations for the role phenomena.
And formal derivations for role propositions have been hard to find.” Role theory has a
number of limitations in that there is no grand theory present here. Many theorists argue
over the basic concepts including what expectations are, what a role is, and who is the
role occupant.
Another area that should be studied further from this topic is whether the conflict
for the role lies within the person or the role itself. If a person that is occupying the role
has different expectations for the role, how does that affect role conflict. Applying this to
DHS would be especially interesting in that the Department was new and some people
would look at that as an opportunity to create their role, while others may not. That could
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have an effect on not just the employee occupying a particular role, but the agency in
which that person works.
Another limitation to this study was only utilizing the mission statements to
garner the expectations that Congress and the President have for the agencies. This
would require another area of further study to see where agencies get their expectations if
not from the mission statement. This study also utilized legislation, however there are
questions there because the legislation to set-up that outlines the mission and duties of the
agency may not be as up to date as the role they are fulfilling. While this is not
necessarily an issue within DHS, as time goes on it does become more of one.
The complaints regarding grant funding have not changed since DHS began
giving out grants in 2001 immediately following September 11th. Every year DHS has
changed the grant process and that is part of the conflict between the states and DHS.
Many states believe that DHS was created to fix the problem related to grant funding
however, because DHS has been in constant flux for the past five years the grant process
has been in flux for the past five years. Now that another election year and
Administration change is upon us DHS will change again. From the outside it appears
that DHS agencies have their missions in order, and that will contribute to the employees
understanding their role. However, management should always be conscious to convey
each employee’s role within the offices, bureaus, agencies, and the Department as a
whole.
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Appendix A – Outline of Agency Missions
Department of Homeland
Security

Organization
1. The U.S. Customs Service
(Treasury)

2. The Immigration and
Naturalization Service (part)
(Justice)

The mission of DHS: (A) prevent terrorist attacks within the U.S.; (B) reduce the
vulnerability of the U.S. to terrorism; (C) minimize the damage, and assist in the
recovery, from terrorist attacks that do occur within the U.S.; (D) carry out all
functions of entities transferred to the DHS including by acting as a focal point
regarding natural and manmade crises and emergency planning; (E) ensure that the
functions of the agencies and subdivisions within the DHS that are not related directly
to securing the homeland are not diminished or neglected except by a specific explicit
Act of Congress; (F) ensure that the overall economic security of the U.S. is not
diminished by efforts, activities, and programs aimed at securing the homeland; and
(G) monitor connections between illegal drug trafficking and terrorism, coordinate
efforts to sever such connections, and otherwise contribute to efforts to interdict
illegal drug trafficking (Homeland Security Act of 2002)
Agency Mission in 2000
Mission in DHS
We are the guardians of our Nation's
Became part of the CBP, whose mission
borders - America's frontline. We serve
is: As the single unified border agency
and protect the American public with
of the United States, the CBP mission is
integrity, innovation, and pride. We
vitally important to the protection of
enforce the laws of the United States,
America and the American people.
safeguard the revenue, and foster lawful
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/toolbox/ab
out/mission/
international trade and travel.
The mission of INS is to administer and
enforce the immigration and naturalization
laws of the United States, including
securing the Nation's borders and
apprehending illegal immigrants.

INS was disbanded by the Homeland
security act of 2002. The agency was
separated into Customs and Border
Patrol, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, Office of Policy and
Programs in Under Secretary for
GAO highlights the fact that the mission is Management, and the Bureau of
twofold: one is enforcement that prevents Citizenship and Immigration Service.
illegal immigrants from entering the
Employees went to one of the above new
country and removing those that do; the
bureaus within DHS.
other is a service function that provides

123

3. The Federal Protective
Service

4. The Transportation
Security Administration
(Transportation)

services and benefits to facilitate entry,
residence, employment, and the
naturalization of legal immigrants. (This
was highlighted in a report in 1999 and
2000.)
According to Commission Peck, 2000:
First, here's what our changes in FPS are
all about. We started by defining the FPS
mission and objective; they had not been
clear before. The objective is for FPS to
become the best facilities security
organization in the world. The principal
mission is building security, by which we
mean protecting the affected facility, its
tenants, visitors and their property from
harm. As Assistant Commissioner
Edwards, a veteran police officer and our
top FPS official, says: FPS is not a police
organization; it is a facility security
organization with law enforcement
authority.
http://www.gsa.gov/Portal/gsa/ep/content
View.do?pageTypeId=8169&channelId=18801&P=XAE&contentId=11765&conte
ntType=GSA_BASIC accessed on March
17, 2007
TSA was federalized in 2001

124

The Department of Homeland Security's
(DHS) Federal Protective Service (FPS)
provides law enforcement and security
services to over one million tenants and
daily visitors to federally owned and
leased facilities nationwide. FPS'
protection services focus directly on the
interior security of the nation, and
require close coordination and
intelligence sharing with the
investigative functions within DHS. FPS
is a full service agency with a
comprehensive HAZMAT, Weapons of
Mass Destruction (WMD), Canine, and
emergency response program as well as
state-of-the-art communication and
dispatch Mega centers.
http://www.gsa.gov/Portal/gsa/ep/channe
lView.do?pageTypeId=8195&channelPa
ge=/ep/channel/gsaOverview.jsp&chann
elId=-12951
We are the Transportation Security
Administration, formed immediately
following the tragedies of Sept. 11. Our
agency is a component of the
Department of Homeland Security and is
responsible for security of the nation's

5. Federal Law Enforcement
Training Center (Treasury)

6. Animal and Plant Health
Inspection Service
(part)(Agriculture)

The mission didn’t change from before;
the authority just went to DHS.

transportation systems.
We train those who protect our
homeland. Vision: We must provide
fast, flexible, and focused training to
secure and protect America. From their
website accessed on March 16, 2007

FLETC's mission statement and
Memoranda of Understanding (MOU)
signed by over 80 Partner Organizations
clearly outline the Center's role and
responsibilities. FLETC is the primary
provider of career-long federal law
enforcement training and prepares law
enforcement professionals to fulfill their
responsibilities safely and proficiently.
The purpose of the program is to provide
Federal, state, local, and international
agents and officers who graduate FLETC
the skills and knowledge needed to
perform their law enforcement functions
effectively and professionally. The
program develops uniform standards for
training programs, facilities and
instructors to ensure high caliber training
across agencies.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/expect
more/detail/10000014.2005.html
APHIS provides leadership in ensuring the Within the APHIS structure, animal
health and care of animals and plants,
quarantine inspection activities at ports
improving agricultural productivity and
of entry were transferred from the
competitiveness, and contributing to the
Veterinary Services (VS) division to the
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national economy and the public health.
http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps3025/
mission.html
The APHIS mission satisfies five strategic
goals. They include:
(1) safeguarding plant and animal
resources from foreign pests and diseases;
(2) minimizing production losses and
export market disruptions by quickly
detecting and responding to outbreaks of
agricultural pests and diseases;
(3) minimizing risks to agricultural
production, natural resources, and human
health and safety by effectively managing
pests and diseases and wildlife damages;
(4) ensuring the humane care and
treatment of animals; and,
(5) developing safe and effective scientific
pest and disease control methods.
http://www.usda.gov/agency/ocr/downloa
d/MRP-Hawks-3.12.03.pdf
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Plant Protection division in 1974. As a
result, the Plant Protection Division
became Plant Protection and Quarantine
(PPQ). In 2002 the majority of port
inspection activities were transferred to
the newly formed Department of
Homeland Security’s Customs and
Border Protection.
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/about_aphis/
history.shtml
Homeland Security and Agricultural
Border Protection. Traditionally,
APHIS’ Agricultural Quarantine
Inspection (AQI) program has had
responsibility for excluding agricultural
health threats. Annually, thousands of
inspectors have inspected hundreds of
thousands of cargo shipments and tens of
millions of passengers’ baggage arriving
in the United States. They have
intercepted tons of materials whose entry
could jeopardize the agricultural sector.
They have successfully excluded such
threats as foot-and-mouth disease (FMD)
and bovine spongiform encephalopathy
(BSE), which could have devastated not
only the agricultural sector, but other
sectors of the economy as well.
That responsibility is now shared with
the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS). While most AQI staff are

7. Office for Domestic
Preparedness (Justice)

ODP was part of the Office for Justice
Programs within the DOJ. The mission in
2000 was: To provide leadership in
developing the nation’s capacity to
prevent and control crime, administer
justice, and assist crime victims.
http://www.ojp.gov/annualreport/fy00pdf.
pdf
The Office for State and Local Domestic
Preparedness was the office transferred.
Their mission specifically was: To
develop and implement a national
program to enhance the capacity of State
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reassigned to the new Department,
USDA retains the responsibility for
promulgating regulations related to entry
of passengers and commodities into the
United States. We intend to work closely
with our counterparts in DHS. USDA
retains the direct role of ensuring that
passengers and cargoes traveling from
Hawaii and Puerto Rico comply with
specified regulations to protect the health
of the agricultural sector on the
Mainland, including necessary
quarantines. We retain responsibility for
collecting the user fees and will be
periodically reimbursing DHS for their
inspection services.
http://www.usda.gov/agency/ocr/downlo
ad/MRP-Hawks-3.12.03.pdf
DHS office responsible for enhancing
the capacity of state and local
jurisdictions to respond to, and mitigate
the consequences of, incidents of
domestic terrorism.
Now the office of grants and training,
switch was made in 2005.
The mission of G&T is to prepare
America for acts of domestic terrorism
by developing and implementing a
national program to enhance the capacity
of state and local agencies to respond to
incidents of terrorism, particularly those

and local agencies to respond to WMD
terrorist incidents through coordinated
training, equipment acquisition, technical
assistance, and support state and local
exercise training.
http://www.mipt.org/pdf/puttingcttoworka
ppendixp.pdf
We have proposed the establishment of
the Office of State and Local Domestic
Preparedness Support (OSLDPS) within
OJP to provide funds for equipment,
training and technical assistance to state
and local authorities and emergency
responders. OSLDPS is proposed as one
mechanism through which we will
implement the mandate given to the
Justice Department by this Committee to
enhance the capabilities of state and local
jurisdictions to better respond to incidents
of domestic terrorism. Statement of Janet
Reno from 1999 to Congress
http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/ag/testimon
y/1999/agappro020499.htm

8. The Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA)

The mission of FEMA is to reduce the
loss of life and property and protect our
institutions from all hazards by leading
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involving chemical, biological,
radiological, nuclear and explosive
(CBRNE) incidents, through coordinated
training, equipment acquisition,
technical assistance, and support for
Federal, state, and local exercises.
G&T fulfills this mission through a
series of program efforts responsive to
the specific requirements of state and
local agencies. G&T works directly with
emergency responders and conducts
assessments of state and local needs and
capabilities to guide the development
and execution of these programs.
Assistance provided by G&T is directed
at a broad spectrum of state and local
emergency responders, including
firefighters, emergency medical services,
emergency management agencies, law
enforcement, and public officials.
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/about/mis
sion.htm
In 2005, SLGCP was incorporated under
the Preparedness Directorate as the
Office of Grants and Training (G&T).
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/about/ove
rview.htm
Lead America to prepare for, prevent,
respond to and recover from disasters.

9. Strategic National
Stockpile and the National
Disaster Medical System
(HHS)

10. Nuclear Incident Response
Team (Energy)

and supporting the Nation in a
comprehensive, risk-based emergency
management program of mitigation,
preparedness, response and recovery.
The original mission of the National
Disaster Medical System was to support
state and local health agencies during
natural disasters and to provide back-up
support to DOD and Veterans
Administration medical systems during
times of overseas conflict.
http://oversight.house.gov/Documents/200
51209095733-01279.pdf
CDC's Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)
has large quantities of medicine and
medical supplies to protect the American
public if there is a public health
emergency (terrorist attack, flu outbreak,
earthquake) severe enough to cause local
supplies to run out. Once Federal and
local authorities agree that the SNS is
needed, medicines will be delivered to any
state in the U.S. within 12 hours. Each
state has plans to receive and distribute
SNS medicine and medical supplies to
local communities as quickly as possible.
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/stockpile/
If the US gets nuked by terrorists, the
Nuclear Incident Response Team is ready
to help. The organization offers experts
and equipment to handle nuclear
129

The mission of the NDMS has not
changed. Eric Tolbert’s testimony in
2003 to the House highlighted what the
NDMS does and the response teams.
http://veterans.house.gov/hearings/sched
ule108/apr03/4-10-03o/etolbert.pdf
DHS is now responsible for determining
when and where the stockpile should be
deployed, but HHS continues to manage
the stockpile with assistance by the VA.
http://veterans.house.gov/hearings/sched
ule108/apr03/4-10-03o/etolbert.pdf

The NIRT will operate at the direction of
the Secretary in connection with an
actual or threatened terrorist attack,
major disaster, or other emergency

terrorism, emergencies, and accidents. The
team's personnel provide expertise in areas
such as device assessment and
disablement, intelligence analysis,
credibility assessment, intelligence
analysis, and health physics. The
organization works with other emergency
response groups and engages in drills to
prepare for emergency situations. The
Nuclear Incident Response Team is part of
the Department of Homeland Security.
http://www.answers.com/topic/nuclearincident-response-team?cat=biz-fin

within the US. When there is no need
the EPA and Secretary of DOE will still
be responsible for the NIRT. Section
504 of the Homeland Security Act of
2002
http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com
/hdocs/docs/terrorism/hsa2002.pdf
The Secretary of Energy shall retain
primary responsibility for organizing,
training, and equipping the NIRT’s.
http://armedservices.house.gov/comdocs
/billsandreports/107thcongress/hr5005m
grsamendsummary.pdf

http://www.ndu.edu/library/docs/crs/crs_r
s22023_11jan05.pdf Includes a bit about
what NIRT is.
11. Domestic Emergency
Support Teams (Justice)

The Domestic Emergency Support Team
(DEST) is a stand-by interagency team of
experts that can be quickly assembled in
accordance with pre-event scenarios and
led by the FBI to provide an on-scene
commander (Special Agent in Charge)
with advice and guidance in situations
involving a weapon of mass destruction
(WMD), or other significant domestic
threat. Such DEST guidance could range
from information management and
communications support to instructions on
how to best respond to the detonation of a
chemical, biological, or nuclear weapon,
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Domestic Emergency Support Teams
previously under the Department of
Justice that expeditiously provide expert
advice, guidance and support to the
Federal On-Scene Commander during an
incident involving weapons of mass
destruction or a credible threat.
http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pres
s_release_0100.shtm

or a radiological dispersal device. As
specialized predesignated teams, DEST
has no permanent staff at the FBI or at any
other federal agency.
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/RS21367.pdf

12. National Domestic
Preparedness Office (FBI)

Response to terrorism: After an incident
has occurred, a rapidly deployable
interagency Emergency Support Team
(EST) will provide required capabilities
on scene: a Foreign Emergency Support
Team (FEST) for foreign incidents, and a
Domestic Emergency Support Team
(DEST) for domestic incidents. DEST
membership will be limited to those
agencies required to respond to the
specific incident. Both teams will include
elements for specific types of incidents
such as nuclear, chemical, and biological
threats. Presidential Directive 39 1995
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/docs/pdd39
.htm
The National Domestic Preparedness
Office coordinates all federal efforts,
including those of the Department of
Defense, Federal Emergency Management
Agency, Department of Health and
Human Services, Department of Energy,
and the Environmental Protection Agency,
to assist state and local first responders
with planning, training, equipment, and
exercise necessary to respond to a
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Became the Office of Grants and
Training:
The mission of G&T is to prepare
America for acts of domestic terrorism
by developing and implementing a
national program to enhance the capacity
of state and local agencies to respond to
incidents of terrorism, particularly those
involving chemical, biological,

conventional or non-conventional weapon
of mass destruction (WMD) incident.
http://www.chaosacrossamerica.com/OHS
/Departments/NDPO.htm
Through the National Domestic
Preparedness Office (NDPO), the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) led the
earliest efforts to coordinate federal
assistance to first responders in the area of
domestic terrorism preparedness. NDPO
was established in the FBI by order of the
Attorney General in August 1998 to serve
as a single point of contact—a “one-stop
shop”—through which state and local
authorities could seek interagency
assistance in the areas of planning,
training, equipment, and exercises to
better prepare for domestic terrorist
incidents—particularly those involving
weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).
NDPO’s role was not operational, and the
Office was not responsible for producing
intelligence, preempting terrorist attacks,
directly responding to terrorists attacks, or
conducting investigations. Prior to the
homeland security debate, the functions of
NDPO were transferred from the FBI to
FEMA as part of a wider and earlier effort
by the Bush Administration to consolidate
all federal domestic preparedness
programs in a single agency. One
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radiological, nuclear and explosive
(CBRNE) incidents, through coordinate
training, equipment acquisition,
technical assistance, and support for
Federal, state and local exercises.
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/about/mission.h
tm

2002news report stated that “the office has
been defunct since last year and has no
employees, but it never has been officially
closed.”
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/RS21367.pdf
13. CBRN Countermeasures
Programs (Energy)

The mission and focus of these programs
did not change when merged into DHS.
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Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory 2004
2.3.5.1 Chemical and Biological
Countermeasures Program
This program focuses on addressing the
national needs for technologies to
quickly detect, identify, and mitigate the
use of chemical and biological threat
agents against the U.S. civilian
population. The principal program is the
Chemical and Biological National
Security Program, within which are
several notable projects, including the
Biological Aerosol Sentry and
Information System Project,
Autonomous Pathogen Detection
System, Advanced Biodetection
Technology, Biological Signatures, the
Forensic Science Center, in situ
Chemical Sensors, and Remote
Chemical Sensing.
2.3.5.2 Nuclear and Radiological
Countermeasures Program
The Nuclear and Radiological
Countermeasures Program develops
technical capabilities aimed at

14. Environmental
Measurements Laboratory
(Energy)

The laboratory is part of DoE. It measures
and evaluates radiation in the
environment.
http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/
PubLibrary/B.20020912.Prospects_for_th
e_/B.20020912.Prospects_for_the_.php
The Environmental Measurements
Laboratory conducts scientific and
technical investigations related to
environmental surveillance and
monitoring, site and facility
characterization and decontamination and
decommissioning. The Environmental
Measurements Laboratory provides the
Department of Energy and other Federal
agencies with a responsive and objective
technical capability to: assure sampling,
measurement and analysis quality and
assess risk of human exposure to
radioactivity and other energy-related
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countering the threat of terrorist use of a
nuclear or radiological device in or near
a U.S. population center, or from
detecting and tracking nuclear material
to forensic attribution in the event of a
nuclear incident. Projects include nuclear
emergency response, cargo container
security, radiation detection, and
detection and tracking systems.
http://www.eh.doe.gov/nepa/docs/deis/ei
s0348/volume_1/VolumeI-chap2.pdf
The Environmental Measurements
Laboratory (EML), a governmentowned, government-operated laboratory,
is part of the Science and Technology
(S&T) Directorate of the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS). The
Laboratory advances and applies the
science and technology required for
preventing, protecting against, and
responding to radiological and nuclear
events in the service of Homeland and
National Security.
EML’s current programs focus on issues
associated with environmental radiation
and radioactivity. Specifically, EML
provides DHS with environmental
radiation and radioactivity measurements
in the laboratory or field, technology
development and evaluation, personnel
training, instrument calibration,

pollutants. The Environmental
Measurements Laboratory provides the
Department and other Federal agencies
with an inhouse, high quality scientific
capability to address important issues
related to national security.
http://www.cfo.doe.gov/budget/01budget/
defem/prgdir.pdf

15. National BW Defense
Analysis Center (Defense)

This center is a DoD research facility
chartered to develop countermeasures for
terrorist attacks.
http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/
PubLibrary/B.20020912.Prospects_for_th
e_/B.20020912.Prospects_for_the_.php
Mission is to develop countermeasures to
potential attacks by terrorists using
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performance testing, data management,
and data quality assurance.
http://www.research.umd.umich.edu/file
admin/template/researchsponsored/files/
DOE_Labs.doc
http://sphweb02.umdnj.edu/sphweb/files
/bio/cv/Erickson_Apr-20-2006_CV.doc
States: “In formation of the Department
of Homeland Security, Congress directed
that EML transfer from the Department
of Energy into the Science and
Technology Directorate of DHS. This
transition entailed change of both
mission and administrative relationships.
EML rapidly and expertly built upon its
core competencies to meet the new
mission of advancing and applying the
science and technology required for
preventing, protecting against, and
responding to radiological and nuclear
events in the service of Homeland and
National Security.”
The $420 million included in the
president's fiscal 2003 Defense
Department's budget for the military
chemical and biological defense program
would be transferred to the Homeland
Security Department. It would be used to
establish the National Bioweapons
Defense Analysis Center, which would
have the mission of coordinating

weapons of mass destruction.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/lib
rary/congress/2002_hr/80431.pdf
SEC. 907. NATIONAL BIO-WEAPONS
DEFENSE ANALYSIS CENTER.
There is established in the Department of
Defense a National Bio-Weapons Defense
Analysis Center, whose mission is to
develop countermeasures to potential
attacks by terrorists using weapons of
massdestruction.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/deptofhomela
nd/bill/title9.html#907
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countermeasures to potential attacks by
terrorists using weapons of mass
destruction.
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsar
ticle.aspx?id=43669
Mission and Objectives:
HSPD-10 outlines four essential pillars
of the nation’s biodefense program and
provides specific directives to further
strengthen the significant gains made in
the past three years.
The four pillars of the program are:
• Threat Awareness, which includes
biological weapons-related intelligence,
vulnerability assessments, and
anticipation of future threats. New
initiatives will improve our ability to
collect, analyze, and disseminate
intelligence on biological weapons and
their potential
users.
• Prevention and Protection, which
includes interdiction and critical
infrastructure protection. New initiatives
will improve our ability to detect,
interdict, and seize weapons
technologies and materials to disrupt the
proliferation trade, and to pursue
proliferators through strengthened law
enforcement cooperation.
• Surveillance and Detection, which

includes attack warning and attribution.
New initiatives will further strengthen
the biosurveillance capabilities being put
in place in fiscal year 2005.
• Response and Recovery, which
includes response planning, mass
casualty care, risk communication,
medical countermeasures, and
decontamination. New initiatives will
strengthen our ability to provide mass
casualty care and to decontaminate the
site of an attack.
The Department of Homeland Security
has a role and responsibility in each of
these four pillars of the national
biodefense program. The S&T
Directorate has the responsibility to lead
the Department’s RDT&E activities to
support the national biodefense
objectives and the Department’s mission.
* Renamed the National Bio-Defense
Analysis and Countermeasures Center
The NBACC’s mission will support two
pillars of this blueprint – threat
awareness and surveillance and
detection. The NBACC is made up of
two centers, the Biological Threat
Characterization Center and the National
Bioforensic Analysis Center to carry out
these missions.
Specifically, NBACC’s mission is to:
• Understand current and future
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16. Plum Island Animal
Disease Center (Agriculture)

Scientists at Plum Island conduct research
and diagnostics on animal diseases that
are not present in the U.S., but could pose
a major economic threat to agriculture
here. ARS owns and operates the island,
and conducts research on foot-and-mouth
disease, African swine fever, hog cholera,
and vesicular somatitis. The APHIS
Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic
Laboratory has diagnostic and training
responsibilities for these and other foreign
diseases. As PIADC director, Huxsoll will
coordinate the activities of both.
http://ars.usda.gov/is/pr/2000/000602.2.ht
m June 2, 2000
Plum Island Animal Disease Center is a
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biological threats, assess vulnerabilities,
and determine potential impacts to guide
the research, development, and
acquisition of biodefense
countermeasures such as detectors,
drugs, vaccines and decontamination
technologies; and
• Provide a national capability for
conducting forensic analysis of evidence
from biocrimes and terrorism to attain a
“biological fingerprint” In FY 2004, the
Department completed the planning and
conceptual design of the NBACC
facility.
http://help.senate.gov/Hearings/2005_02
_08/albright.pdf
At the Plum Island Animal Disease
Center, the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA) has an important
job.
We work to protect farm animals,
farmers and ranchers, the nation's farm
economy and export markets... and your
food supply.
Plum Island is located off the
northeastern tip of New York's Long
Island. USDA activities at Plum Island
are carried out by scientists and
veterinarians with the department's
Agricultural Research Service (ARS)
and Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service (APHIS).

17. Federal Computer Incident
Response Center (GSA)

US Department of Agriculture (USDA)
facility devoted to diagnosing and
researching foreign diseases of animals.
Named for the beach plums that grow
along its shores, Plum Island's ownership
was transferred to the USDA's
Agricultural Research Service (ARS) in
1954 to establish a laboratory to study
foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) and other
exotic animal diseases. The diagnostic
activities at Plum Island were transferred
from ARS to the Animal and Plant Health
Inspection Service (APHIS) in 1983.
Since then, under the administration of
ARS, APHIS has maintained a foreign
animal disease diagnostic laboratory
(FADDL) on the island.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/facilit
y/plum_island.htm
FedCIRC, in order to further secure our
government technology systems and
services.

We're proud of our role as America's
first line of defense against foreign
animal diseases.
We're equally proud of our safety record.
Not once in our nearly 50 years of
operation has an animal pathogen
escaped from the island.
In 2003 the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) joined us on the island,
taking responsibility for the safety and
security of the facility.
http://www.ars.usda.gov/main/site_main.
htm?modecode=19400000

It appears as if the FedCIRC is now the
US-CERT.

The United States Computer Emergency
Readiness Team (US-CERT) is a
FedCIRC is a collaborative partnership
drawing on the skills and resources within partnership between the Department of
Homeland Security and the public and
Government, academia, and the private
sector to address computer security related private sectors. Established in 2003 to
incidents. Federal civilian agencies turn to protect the nation's Internet
infrastructure, US-CERT coordinates
FedClRC for assistance in identifying,
defense against and responses to cyber
containing and recovering from adverse
attacks across the nation. The Federal
events that impact on the confidentiality,
Computer Incident Response Center
integrity or availability of information
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traversing the critical information
infrastructure.
http://www.gsa.gov/Portal/gsa/ep/content
View.do?noc=T&contentType=GSA_BA
SIC&contentId=11775
Federal Computer Incident Response
Center. The center assists agencies with
incident prevention and response.
http://oig.state.gov/documents/organizatio
n/13679.pdf

(FedCIRC), established in Oct 1996 by
the National Institute for Science and
Technology (NIST) as a pilot program
and taken over by the General Services
Administration (GSA) in October 1998
as an operational entity, formed the
initial nucleus of the US-CERT when
DHS was established in March 2003.
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/priva
cy/privacy_pia_nppd_24x7.pdf

http://www.us-cert.gov/press_room/usDeveloped FedCIRC in 1996 as a pilot
cert-announced.html
program. It became operational in 1998
The US-CERT will complement current
and was moved to GSA's Federal
security capabilities, including the
Technology Service. The overarching
Federal Computer Incident Response
mission of the FedCIRC is to be the
Center (FedCIRC), which coordinates
Federal Civilian Government's trusted
incident warning and response
focal point for computer security incident information across Federal Civilian
reporting, sharing information on common Government agencies.
vulnerabilities, and to provide assistance
with incident prevention and response.
http://www.gsa.gov/Portal/gsa/ep/content
View.do?contentId=11782&contentType=
GSA_BASIC
Four activities performed by the
FedCIRC:
*Provide timely technical assistance to
operators of agency information systems
regarding security incidents, including
guidance on detecting and handling
information security incidents
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*Compile and analyze information about
incidents that threaten information
security .
*Inform operators of agency information
systems about current and potential
information security threats and
vulnerabilities.
*Consult with agencies or offices
operating or exercising control of national
security systems.
18. National Communications
System (Defense)

The National Communications System, an
interagency body of 22 federal
departments and agencies, would transfer
from the Defense Department to the
Homeland Security Department.
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarti
cle.aspx?id=43669

On November 15, 2005, the NCS
became part of the Department's
Directorate for Preparedness after nearly
two years under the Information
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection
Directorate.
Created by Kennedy after the Cuban
Missile Crisis: The NCS mandate
included linking, improving, and
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/exec extending the communications facilities
ordr/eo12472.htm EO 12472 by Regan in and components of various Federal
84 outlined new mission, amended in
agencies, focusing on interconnectivity
2003
and survivability. With the addition of
the Office of the Director, National
Intelligence in September 2007, the NCS
membership currently stands at 24
members.
http://www.ncs.gov/about.html
http://www.ncs.gov/org_chart.html Org
chart outlines what exactly NCS is
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responsible for:
• Providing the expertise for the
planning, implementing,
administering, and maintenance of
approved national security and
emergency preparedness (NS/EP)
communications programs and NCS
baseline activities.
• Conducting technical studies,
analyses, and assessments pertaining
to the effectiveness of NS/EP
communications programs and the
effects of these programs on the
Nation's critical infrastructures.
• Consulting with the Committee of
Principals (COP), the NCS Council of
Representatives (COR), and the
President’s National Security
Telecommunications Advisory
Committee (NSTAC) on issues
pertaining to NS/EP
telecommunications.
• Participating on Federal councils and
boards, such as the President's Critical
Infrastructure Protection Board and
the National Infrastructure Advisory
Council (NIAC), that develop
telecommunications policies,
standards, national initiatives, and
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performing research on emerging
technologies.
• Monitoring international emergency
telecommunications planning
activities and offering assistance to
international emergency planning
groups.
• Developing, planning, and
implementing National
Communications System (NCS)
strategic goals and objectives.

19. National Infrastructure
Protection Center (FBI)

Within the last year the NIPC was
established to deter, detect, analyze,
investigate and provide warnings of cyber
threats and attacks on the critical
infrastructures of the United States,
including illegal intrusions into
government and private sector computer
networks. The NIPC will also evaluate,
acquire, and deploy computer equipment
and cyber tools to support investigations
and infrastructure protection efforts.
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• Assisting individual NCS member
organizations in developing efficient
cost- effective solutions to complex
communication/information
requirements and resolutions to
organizational
communication/information issues
On May 22, 1998, the President issued
Presidential Decision Directive 63
(PDD-63), which called for the creation
of a national plan to protect the services
on which we depend daily. NIPC has
moved from the FBI into the Department
of Homeland Security under the
Information Analysis and Infrastructure
Protection Directorate.
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercri
me/critinfr.html

Statement by Janet Reno 1999
http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/ag/testimon
y/1999/agappro020499.htm
The National Infrastructure Protection
Center (NIPC) at the FBI which will fuse
representatives from FBI, DOD, USSS,
Energy, Transportation, the Intelligence
Community, and the private sector in an
unprecedented attempt at information
sharing among agencies in collaboration
with the private sector. The NIPC will
also provide the principal means of
facilitating and coordinating the Federal
Government's response to an incident,
mitigating attacks, investigating threats
and monitoring reconstitution efforts;
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime
/factsh.htm
The National Infrastructure Protection
Center (NIPC), created by Attorney
General Janet Reno and FBI Director
Louis Freeh in February 1998, addresses
the growing threat of illicit computer
activity, particularly as it affects critical
national infrastructures. The mission of
NIPC is to assess, warn of, respond to, and
investigate illegal acts involving computer
and information technologies, and
unlawful acts that threaten or target our
critical infrastructures.
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http://www.esisac.com/publicdocs/NICC
%20Watch%20Office%20Info.doc
Recently, the former National
Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC)
was fully integrated into the Information
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection
Directorate of the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS). As such, the
responsibilities of fulfilling the mission
of physical and cyber critical
infrastructure assessment and protection
of the former NIPC are now being
addressed by two new divisions.

20. Energy Security and
Assurance Program (Energy)

http://www.calea.org/Online/newsletter/N
o75/The%20National%20Infrastructure%
20Protection%20Center.htm
Mission did not change when merged into
DHS

21. The Secret Service

Mission did not change with merger
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http://www.cfo.doe.gov/budget/05budget
/content/otherdef/ea.pdf The Energy
Security and Assurance Program leads
the Federal government’s effort to
ensure a robust, secure, and reliable
energy infrastructure in the new threat
environment that includes malevolent
threats and increasing complexity due to
interdependencies. EA works with
States, local governments, and the
private sector to coordinate protection
activities and cultivate collaborative
partnerships to assure public safety,
public confidence, and service in the
energy sector.
The United States Secret Service is
mandated by statute and executive order
to carry out two significant missions:
protection and criminal investigations.
The Secret Service protects the president
and vice president, their families, heads
of state, and other designated
individuals; investigates threats against
these protectees; protects the White
House, vice president’s residence,
foreign missions, and other buildings
within Washington, D.C.; and plans and
implements security designs for
designated National Special Security

Events. The Secret Service also
investigates violations of laws relating to
counterfeiting of obligations and
securities of the United States; financial
crimes that include, but are not limited
to, access device fraud, financial
institution fraud, identity theft, computer
fraud; and computer-based attacks on
our nation’s financial, banking, and
telecommunications infrastructure.
http://www.secretservice.gov/mission.sht
ml

22. The Coast Guard

The six non-homeland security missions
highlighted in the Homeland Security Act
of 2002: marine safety, search and rescue,
aids to navigation, living marine
resources, marine environmental
protections, and ice operations.
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With the growing threat of
TERRORISM, the mission of the Secret
Service has expanded. In 2000 Congress
enacted the Presidential Threat
Protection Act. This law authorized the
Secret Service to participate in the
planning, coordination, and
implementation of security operations at
special events of national significance
("National Special Security Event"), as
determined by the president.
http://law.jrank.org/pages/10077/SecretService.html
Its core roles are to protect the public,
the environment, and U.S. economic and
security interests in any maritime region
in which those interests may be at risk,
including international waters and
America's coasts, ports, and inland

The five homeland security missions
added to the Coast Guard: ports,
waterways, and coastal security, drug
interdiction, migrant interdiction, defense
readiness, and other law enforcement.

waterways. To serve the public, the
Coast Guard has five fundamental roles:
Maritime Safety; Maritime Security;
Maritime Mobility; National Defense;
and Protection of Natural Resources.
http://uscg.mil/top/missions/

Sources:

http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/
hdocs/docs/terrorism/hsa2002.pdf
Customs info From this website
http://www.traveloasis.com/uscustravin.ht
ml accessed on March 16, 2007
FPS info from

INS info from
http://www.flra.gov/fsip/finalact/01fs_21
0.html on March 17, 2007
TSA info
http://www.tsa.gov/who_we_are/what_is
_tsa.shtm accessed on March 17, 2007
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Appendix B – DHS Organizational Chart
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